

754.

"BEFORE WHICH THE BOARD WILL NOT ACCEPT ANY FURTHER APPLICATION BY THE PRISONER FOR RELEASE ON PAROLE" (CSA, s. 67(9)(c) [107. AND 108.]), WHICH, BY ITS OPERATIONAL EFFECT, AS THE DATE PRIOR TO WHICH BOARD WILL NOT ACCEPT SUCH 'NEW APPLICATION FOR RELEASE ON PAROLE', MEANS THAT 'A PERIOD OF TIME' THEREAT EXISTS WHICH PROHIBITS RELEASE ON PAROLE OF RESPECTIVE LIFER, AND THAT 'PERIOD OF TIME' IS THEREFORE EQUAL TO (IN OPERATIONAL ENFORCEMENT TERMS), A NON-PAROLE PERIOD, BECAUSE PAROLE RELEASE CANNOT BE RECEIVED ~~UNTIL~~ AFTER EXPIRY OF COURT IMPOSED AND SPECIFIED DATE OF NON-PAROLE, WHICH ITSELF (THE 'DATE'), CARRIES A MANDATORY OPERATIONAL ATTACHMENT TO THE DATE WHICH COURT ALSO IMPOSES AND SPECIFIES AS THE START DATE OF LIFER'S COURT IMPOSED SENTENCE, WHICH IS SIGNIFICANT IN THAT THE COURT IMPOSED AND SPECIFIED START DATE (OF SENTENCE), UP TO THE COURT IMPOSED AND SPECIFIED DATE OF NON-PAROLE, CALCULATES TO THEREIN IDENTIFY AS COURT IMPOSED NON-PAROLE PERIOD ([87.]

755.

"... MEANS A PERIOD FIXED BY A COURT... DURING WHICH... PRISONER... NOT RELEASED ON PAROLE"), AND WHICH I STATED/DESCRIBED ABOVE AS 'PERIOD OF TIME', SO WITH OPERATIONAL REGARD AND OPERATIONAL EFFECT OF WHAT IS THE ACTUAL 'PERIOD OF TIME', THAT PAROLE BOARD AND STATE GOVERNMENT ENFORCE AS RESPECTIVE LIFER'S NON-PAROLE PERIOD OF DATE COMMENCED UNTIL DATE CONCLUDED, IRRESPECTIVE OF WHETHER SUCH 'PERIOD OF TIME' IS CREATED, IMPOSED AND DELIVERED BY A COMPETENT COURT, OR CREATED, IMPOSED AND DELIVERED (CONSEQUENTIAL TO SOUTH AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT REFUSING/REJECTING LIFER'S APPLICATION FOR RELEASE ON PAROLE, THEN OPERATING CSA, s. 67(9) OUTCOME DELIVERY OF NON-PAROLE PERIOD INCREASE TO LIFER (CSA, ss. 67(9)(c), 67(10))), BY THE PAROLE BOARD ITSELF (CSA, ss. 67(9), 67(9)(a), 67(9)(c), 67(10) [107., 108., 109., 82., 83. AND 45.]), WHATEVER THE ACTUAL 'PERIOD OF TIME' IS WHICH IS BEING ENFORCED (BY COURT (TRUE SENTENCE), BY PAROLE BOARD (FAKE SENTENCE)), IT IS ENFORCED BY THE STATE GOVERNMENT (DPP, ATTORNEY-GENERAL, CORRECTIONAL SERVICES DEPARTMENT, PAROLE BOARD AND MINISTER FOR CORRECTIONAL SERVICES), AS A 'NON-PAROLE PERIOD OF TIME WITHIN WHICH THE LIFER WILL NOT BE GRANTED RELEASE ON PAROLE, OR RECEIVE PAROLE RELEASE',

756.

AND SO FOR THE ABOVE REASONS, THE 'SECOND ADDITIONAL DECISION' (WHICH IS A REFERENCE TO 'PAROLE-RELEASE APPLICATION DATE'), AND THE 'ADDITIONAL DECISION' (WHICH IS A REFERENCE TO 'ACTUAL PAROLE-RELEASE'), ARE ONE IN THE SAME DATE, DUE TO A CREATED AND IMPOSED 'PERIOD OF TIME' WHEREIN PAROLE-RELEASE APPLICATION WILL NOT BE ACCEPTED (CSA, s. 67(9)(c) [107. AND 108.]), AND 'ACTUAL PAROLE-RELEASE' CANNOT BE EFFECTED UNTIL AFTER PAROLE-RELEASE APPLICATION IS RECEIVED, BY PAROLE BOARD [94.], IN THE PRESCRIBED MANNER

757.

[96.], AND THEN PROCESSED BY THE BOARD PER STATUTE REQUIREMENT (THE PROCESSING PHASE, ACCORDING TO DUE PROCESS [SEE PARAGRAPH 357, IBID (AND WHERE 'CSA, s. 67(9)' IS STATED AS A 'DUE PROCESS FEATURE', IT IS NOT A CONSTITUTIONALLY [1.] PERMITTED PROCESS AGAINST A LIFER, FOR ABOVE REASONS, AND IS THEREFORE AN ILLEGAL ACT ~~PERPETRATED AGAINST A LIFER~~ PERPETRATED AGAINST A LIFER, AND IS HIGHLIGHTED TO SHOW HOW LITTLE REGARD IS GIVEN TO TRUE LEGALITY OF STATUTE AMENDMENTS, INTO [46.], SUCH AS CSA, s. 67(9) [107.], WHICH IS NOT WORDED IN ANY POSITIVE, AFFIRMATIVE OR UNAMBIGUOUS WAY [65.], SO AS TO 'STRICTLY INCLUDE LIFERS WITHIN THE PURPOSE AND FUNCTION OF CSA, s. 67(9) IN ANY WAY WHATSOEVER' (AND IN POINT OF FACT, THE REASON WHY IS BECAUSE CH. II [3.] PROHIBITS THE EFFECT OF OPERATION OF ANY PART OF CSA. ss. 67(9) AND 67(10), FROM BEING ACTIONED AGAINST A LIFER, ANY STANDARD LIFER, WHO HAS A COURT IMPOSED NPP), WITH THE STATUTORY DUE PROCESS REQUIRED, IF STATE GOVERNMENT DOESN'T WANT TO PAROLE-RELEASE LIFER, MANDATING OPERATION OF CLSA [34.], AS DESCRIBED IN WATSON [194. (PARAGRAPHS 28, 29. AND 30. IN FULL FROM JUDGMENT)], AND PARAGRAPH 362, IBID (INDICATING COMPONENTS OF DUE PROCESS RELATING TO A LIFER'S 'PAROLE-RELEASE APPLICATION TO THE BOARD')), AND BOTH 'ADDITIONAL DECISION' AND 'SECOND ADDITIONAL DECISION' ARE CRITICALLY MARRIED TO 'THE RESULT CONSEQUENCED BY THE 'OFFICIAL DECISION' NOT BEING DUE PROCESSED BY THE SOUTH

758.

AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT AND ITS AGENTS', INCLUDING PAROLE BOARD, WHICH ALSO MEANS

759.

THAT ALL ADDITIONAL/ "FURTHER APPLICATIONS" (CSA. ss. 67(9)(c), 67(10) [107., 108., 109.], CSA. ss. 67(2), 67(3) [96. AND 97.]), ARE 'IMPROPERLY PERFORMED AND PURSUED BY LIFER APPLICANT' (IF PURSUED AFTER OPERATION OF CSA. ss. 67(9)

760. AND 67(10)), BECAUSE, LIFER MUST APPLY FOR PAROLE-RELEASE IN THE PRESCRIBED MANNER [96., 94. AND 95.], EXCEPT THAT NOT ONLY IS THE OPERATION OF CSA, SS. 67(9) AND 67(10) A PROHIBITED ACTION (AS IT CONSISTS OF ILLEGALLY PERFORMED ACTIONS AND EVENTS, AND ILLEGALLY CONSTRUCTED/CREATED DECISIONS), AND THE DECISIONS/ DETERMINATIONS BORNE FROM, ALSO ILLEGALLY OBTAINED BY THE STATE GOVERNMENT, AND INCLUDES ILLEGALLY EFFECTED 'NOTIFICATION' TO LIFER ("BOARD MUST... NOTIFY THE PRISONER IN WRITING" CSA, S. 67(9) [107.]), AND THAT 'A LEGALLY ENFORCEABLE DECISION' (AS NOTIFIED BY OPERATION OF CSA, S. 67(9)(C)),
761. CANNOT COMPETENTLY EXIST IF THE VERY EXISTENCE OF IT IS ILLEGALLY PRODUCED,
762. AND ALSO, THE ORIGINAL 'OFFICIAL DECISION' WAS NOT LAWFULLY PROCESSED VIA APPLICATION TO THE COMPETENT COURT, LEAVING SAID 'OFFICIAL DECISION' STILL IN PLAY (BUT IN LIMBO AS IT HAS NOT BEEN PROGRESSSED THROUGH COURT, AND 'CSA, S. 67(9) IS AN OUTCOME NOTIFICATION WHICH CAN'T LEGALLY (WITH CONSTITUTIONAL [1.] COMPETENCE), BE OPERATED/IMPOSED AGAINST A LIFER', AS ABOVE DESCRIBED), SO WHERE LIFER'S RELEASE APPLICATION IS 'STILL IN PLAY', AND BOARD CANNOT LAWFULLY 'REFUSE/REJECT SAID APPLICATION AND THEN IMPOSE NEW PERIOD OF NON-PAROLE' (WHICH IS WHAT CSA, S. 67(9) ILLEGALLY EFFECTS/ ACTIONS AGAINST A LIFER), THE 'STATUS OF LIFER'S PAROLE APPLICATION' (IF ALL CONSTITUTIONALLY [1.] COMPETENT AND PERMITTED ACTIONS, EVENTS, DECISIONS, JUDGMENTS, SENTENCES, STATUTORY IMPOSITIONS, ETC. ARE OBSERVED [82., 83., 3., 45., 84. AND 85.]), MUST BE 'UNRESOLVED AND AWAITING OPERATION OF CSA, SS. 67(6)(A)(i), 67(6)(A)(ii) [100.], AND PROPER DELIVERY OF SAID ACTUAL RELEASE ON PAROLE (PER DATE RECOMMENDED CSA, S. 67(6)(A)(i), AND APPROVED CSA, SS. 67(6)(A), 67(6)(B), 67(7)), AND AS LIFER'S LEGITIMATE PAROLE-RELEASE APPLICATION [94.] IS 'STILL IN PLAY', AND AS SUCH IS STILL AN ACTIVE APPLICATION FOR PAROLE-RELEASE [94.], PLUS, LIFER CAN ONLY HAVE ONE ACTIVE PAROLE-RELEASE APPLICATION BEFORE THE BOARD AT ANY ONE TIME, THEREFORE, ANY 'ADDITIONAL/ "FURTHER APPLICATIONS"' (CSA, SS. 67(9)(C), 67(10) [107., 108. AND 109.]), SUBMITTED TO THE BOARD [94.], IS IMPROPER AND NOT COMPLIANT WITH
- 765.

THE PRESCRIBED MANNER [96.]' (AND THIS CLAIM IS FURTHER ~~■~~ SUPPORTED BY THE DISTINCT 'LACK OF PROVISIONS' WITHIN CSA, SECTION 67, TO SPECIFICALLY ENABLE A LIFER TO 'RE-APPLY' FOR PAROLE-RELEASE' (BUT THE 'ADDITIONAL QUALIFICATION' MUST ALSO BE MADE, SO AS TO CLARIFY STATUTORY PROCESS, WHICH IS CONSTITUTIONALLY [1.] PERMITTED WITHIN SOUTH AUSTRALIA, WHICH IS, 'AFTER OPERATIONAL START OF [123. AND 124.], ALSO DESCRIBED (IN MORE DETAIL), IN ANDREWS JUDGMENT 2008 [207.], PARAGRAPH 20 (IN FULL), AND, CONTINUING AFTER OPERATIONAL START OF [46.] ON 1-8-1994, WHEN A LIFER (WITH COURT IMPOSED NPP), APPLIES FOR PAROLE-RELEASE, THEY MUST DO SO 'IN THE PRESCRIBED MANNER' (AND THE SAID PRESCRIBED MANNER MUST ITSELF BE CONSTITUTIONALLY [1.] PERMISSIBLE (THEREBY ENABLING COMPETENT ACTION WITHIN JURISDICTIONAL COMPETENCE), BUT IF 'STATUTORY PRESCRIBED MANNER' IS ITSELF AN ERRONEOUSLY CONSTRUCTED AND ASSENTED STATUTORY AMENDMENT, SUCH AS BY NOT COMPLYING WITH [28.], THEN THE SPECIFIC 'STATUTORY PRESCRIBED MANNER' MUST BE IMMEDIATELY EXPUNGED FROM OPERATIONAL ENGAGEMENT, AND ITS EXISTING EFFECTS MUST BE IMMEDIATELY RECTIFIED/REPAIRED/REMEDIED), WHICH MUST BE CLEARLY WORDED SO IT CAN BE EASILY UNDERSTOOD BY THOSE WHO ARE INTENDED/EXPECTED TO FUNCTION SAID 'PRESCRIBED MANNER' (SUCH AS LIFERS APPLYING FOR PAROLE-RELEASE, AND THE PAROLE BOARD WHO MUST ALSO OPERATE ITS FUNCTION), AND SO THE ACT OF APPLYING FOR PAROLE-RELEASE MUST FIRST BE AN ^{IDENTIFICATION} ~~IDENTIFICATION~~ OF WHEN PERMITTED TO APPLY [97.], WHICH MUST THEREFORE IDENTIFY AND ACCEPT THE COURT IMPOSED DATE WHICH 'CONCLUDES THE END DATE OF THE NON-PAROLE PERIOD OF TIME' [87.], SO THAT [97.] CAN BE CALCULATED, AND THEREFORE, BECAUSE THE PAROLE BOARD CANNOT WITH ANY CONSTITUTIONAL [1.] COMPETENCE, JURISDICTION OR AUTHORITY (IRRESPECTIVE OF ITS ILLEGAL PRIOR CONDUCT RELATING TO 'SAME EFFECT AGAINST RESPECTIVE LIFERS'), CREATE AND/OR CREATE AND IMPOSE AND/OR CREATE AND IMPOSE AND ENFORCE, ANY OPERATIONAL EFFECT WHICH EQUATE TO THE 'DELIVERY OF WHAT IS TREATED BY STATE GOVERNMENT AS A SENTENCE' (IN A FORM/SUBSTANCE, WHICH IS 'ADDITIONAL TO' AND/OR 'INCREASED FROM' THE COURT IMPOSED NPP [87., 97. AND 194. (PARA. 11.)]), WHICH IS A REFERENCE TO CSA, SS. 67(9), 67(9)(A), 67(9)(B),

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767.

768. 67(9)(c), 67(10) [107, 108, and 109.], AND AS HEREIN DESCRIBED, THE 'PERIOD OF TIME' ASSOCIATED WITH 'ADDITIONAL DECISION' AND 'SECOND ADDITIONAL DECISION', IS A DESCRIPTION OF WHAT IS BY ITS ENFORCEMENT, 'A NON-PAROLE PERIOD OF TIME' (AND NOT JUST THE 'DELIVERY OF', WHICH IS WHAT CSA. s. 67(9) DOES, BUT ALSO THE 'CREATED PERIOD OF TIME' (WHICH IS 'DELIVERED'), IS ALSO SOMETHING WHICH PAROLE BOARD CANNOT LAWFULLY CREATE AGAINST A LIFER, PARTICULARLY DUE TO BREACHING OF [85.] JURISDICTION TO 'CREATE A DESIGNATE PERIOD', AS SUCH A DESIGNATE PERIOD OF TIME IS ONLY PERMITTED TO BE CREATED BY OPERATION OF [84, 45. AND 38.], WITHIN COMPETENT COURT WITHIN REALM OF CH. III [3.], AND NOT BY ANY OTHER ENTITY/BODY OPERATING WITHIN ANY OTHER REALM OF [1.], SUCH AS FROM REALM OF CH. I [3.] OR CH. II [3.], AND ALSO THE 'ENFORCEMENT OF THE CREATED PERIOD OF TIME', WHICH IS SUBSEQUENTLY DELIVERED (AND THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN 'DELIVERING' SAID 'CREATED PERIOD OF TIME', AND THEN 'IMPOSING' SAID 'DELIVERED PERIOD OF TIME', IS THE 'DELIVERY' IS EFFECTED BY OPERATION OF CSA. s. 67(9), BUT 'IMPOSITION OF THE CREATED PERIOD OF TIME' IS THE 'RECEIPT OF THE CREATED AND DELIVERED PERIOD OF TIME, BY THE RESPECTIVE LIFER (CSA. s. 67(9)(c)), WHICH BOARD THEREAFTER TREAT AS A 'NON-PAROLE PERIOD OF TIME' [SEE TEXT AT 755. AND 756. IBID]), WHERE
770. 'ENFORCEMENT OF' RELATES TO THE STATE GOVERNMENT TREATING, OPERATIONALLY, THE BOARD'S 'CREATED', BOARD'S 'DELIVERED' (UNTO ITSELF, AS THE 'ADDITIONAL DECISION' AND 'SECOND ADDITIONAL DECISION'), AND THEN OPERATING CSA. s. 67(9), TO 'IMPOSE' (RECEIPT OF CSA. s. 67(9)(c) BY RESPECTIVE LIFER), BOARD'S CREATED DATE WHICH THEN ATTRACTS A PROTECTION OF SAID 'BOARD CREATED PERIOD OF TIME', WHEREBY THE BOARD'S CREATED DATE (CSA. s. 67(9)(c)), IS THEREAFTER GIVEN (ALBEIT ILLEGALLY), THE SOUTH AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT'S 'SEAL OF ENFORCEABILITY' AND TREATED WITH THE SAME REGARD AS A COURT'S COMPETENT SENTENCE (WHICH IS WHAT CSA. s. 67(3) ATTACHES TO), EVEN THOUGH IT IS IN FACT A FAKE SENTENCE, ILLEGALLY CREATED AGAINST SAID LIFER), so, BOARD CAN'T CREATE, DELIVER, IMPOSE OR ENFORCE, WITH ANY JURISDICTIONAL COMPETENCE, 'ANY EVENT' WHICH EQUATES TO A 'NON-PAROLE PERIOD OF TIME' [SEE TEXT AT 737, 738,
- 772.

773. 739, 740, 741, 742, 743, 744, 745, 751, 753, 754, 755. IBID], WHEREBY THE BOARD IS CREATOR OF SENTENCE (CSA. s. 67(6), STATE DOES NOT RECOMMEND PAROLE), DELIVERER OF SENTENCE UNTO ITSELF (CSA. s. 67(6)), IMPOSER OF SENTENCE (CSA. ss. 67(6) REFUSE TO RECOMMEND PAROLE, THEN 67(9)(A), 67(9)(B), 67(9)(C), RECEIPT OF 67(9)(C) BY LIFER), ENFORCER OF SENTENCE (CSA. s. 67(9)(C)),
774. AS SUCH AN EVENT IS IN ITS ENTIRETY ^{AN} ~~AN~~ ILLEGAL EVENT, THEREFORE OUTSIDE THE CONSTITUTIONAL OBSERVANCE [SEE TEXT AT 764. IBID] OF DUE PROCESS ACCORDING TO COMPETENT JURISDICTIONAL LAW [65.], AND THEREFORE 'IS IMPROPER' [SEE TEXT AT 765. IBID] TO PARTICIPATE IN OPERATION/FURTHERANCE OF SAID 'EVENT' BY RESPECTIVE LIFER SUCH AS BY SUBMITTING "FURTHER APPLICATION" [SEE TEXT AT 765. IBID], ^{BECAUSE,} ~~■~~ PURSUANT TO COMPETENT LAW WHICH COMPLIES WITH CONSTITUTIONAL [1.] JURISDICTION AND AUTHORITY, THERE IS STILL AN ACTIVE PAROLE-RELEASE APPLICATION IN-PLAY [SEE TEXT AT 762, 763, 764. IBID.], AND PURSUANT TO COMPETENT LAW SAID APPLICATION IS 'IN LIMBO' [SEE TEXT AT 762. IBID.], BUT UNFORTUNATELY FOR WATSON [194.] AND ANDREWS [207.], BOTH LIFERS HAD THEIR PROPER PAROLE-RELEASE APPLICATIONS INFECTED BY 'ALIEN ACTIONS' [SEE TEXT AT 681, 682, 683, 684, 685, 686, 687, 688, 689, 690, 691, 692, 693, 694, 695. IBID], AND SO FOR THE ABOVE REASONS, I STRESS THE
775. POINT OF FACT THAT A LIFER ONLY NEEDS TO APPLY FOR PAROLE-RELEASE ONCE FOR DUE PROCESS RIGHT TO PAROLE-RELEASE, FOR A 'COURT SPECIFIED NPP DATE'
776. (CSA. s. 67(3) MARRIED TO SPECIFIC DATE OF NPP, UNTIL THAT SPECIFIC COURT IMPOSED NPP DATE IS EXTENDED BY LATER COURT HEARING, AT WHICH POINT CSA. s. 67(3) (THE NEXT PAROLE-RELEASE APPLICATION), WOULD THEN BE MARRIED TO 'THE COURT'S NEWLY CREATED NPP DATE', WHICH CAN ONLY BE CREATED BY COURT IF ACHIEVED PER DUE PROCESS OF COMPETENT LAW [SEE PARA. 578. IBID], OTHERWISE, PAROLE MUST BE GRANTED), 'ONLY HAS ONE PERMITTED ENTITLEMENT FOR A LIFER TO APPLY FOR PAROLE-RELEASE (CSA. s. 67(3) [97.]), PER RESPECTIVE
777. COURT IMPOSED NPP, AND THIS FEATURE GOES BACK TO THE THREE COMPETENT LINES OF DUE PROCESS FOR A LIFER ~~TO RECEIVE PAROLE-RELEASE~~ [SEE TEXT AT 729, 730, 731, 732. IBID.], THEREFORE, IN CLARIFICATION OF COMPETENT STATUTORY
- 778.

779. PROCESSES' [REFER TEXT AT 765. IBID.], ONLY ONE APPLICATION FOR PAROLE-RELEASE
IS REQUIRED BY RESPECTIVE LIFER PER SINGLE NPP DATE IMPOSED BY THE COURT
780. [SEE PARA. 578. IBID.], AND IF COURT EXTENDS NPP DATE THEN CSA, s. 67(3)
 781. [97.] ATTACHES TO SAID NEW COURTS' IMPOSED NPP DATE, OTHERWISE, IF NPP IS NOT
NEGATED OR EXTENDED BY THE COURT, THEN PAROLE-RELEASE MUST BE GRANTED FROM
SAID SINGLE SUBMISSION PURSUANT TO CSA, s. 67(3) (BY A LIFER), WHICH IS ALSO
 782. A QUALIFICATION FOR ONLY ONE REQUIRED/PERMITTED SUBMISSION (CSA, s. 67(3)),
PER SINGLE IMPOSED NPP DATE BY COMPETENT COURT, EVIDENCED BY THE WORDING
 OF CSA, s. 67(9) (AS 'ADDITIONAL QUALIFICATION' [SEE TEXT AT 765. IBID.],
 783. THAT A LIFER CAN'T (BY APPLICATION OF/USE OF ANY COMPETENT, AND THEREFORE,
 CONSTITUTIONALLY [1.] PERMISSIBLE ACTION WITHIN ANY SOUTH AUSTRALIAN STATUTE
 RELATING TO INCARCERATION OF A LIFER, PAROLE-RELEASE, SENTENCING, OR ANY
 DUE PROCESS FEATURE OF APPLYING FOR PAROLE, OR ENFORCEMENT OF COURT IMPOSED
 NON-PAROLE ~~PERIOD~~ PERIOD (BY ACTION OF ANY CH. II [3.] GOVERNMENT ENTITY
 THEREIN CLAIMING TO HAVE JURISDICTIONAL COMPETENCE TO SO ACT [82. AND
 83.])), ACTUALLY 'RE-APPLY' FOR PAROLE-RELEASE CONSEQUENTIAL TO ANY ACT
 PERFORMED BY STATE GOVERNMENT, SINCE 1-8-1994, USING [46.], BORNE
DIRECTLY FROM OPERATION OF [107., 108. AND 109.], AS CSA, s. 67(9) IS THE
 OPERATIONAL CONSEQUENCE OF BOARD CREATING AN EXTENDED 'NON-PAROLE PERIOD
 OF TIME' [SEE TEXT AT 770. IBID.], AGAINST A LIFER, WHICH IT LACKS JURISDICTION
 TO DO [194. (PARA. 29, IN FULL FROM JUDGMENT), ALSO, SEE TEXT AT 578. IBID.],
 784. WHICH IT NOTIFIES LIFER ABOUT IN WRITING, AND THEREIN DESCRIBES THAT IN ORDER
 FOR LIFER TO RECEIVE PAROLE-RELEASE, LIFER IS REQUIRED TO OBSERVE AND
 785. ABIDE BY DATES STIPULATED BY CSA, s. 67(9)(c), EQUATING TO FIRSTLY, ANOTHER
 PAROLE-RELEASE APPLICATION WHILST CURRENT APPLICATION IS 'STILL IN PLAY' [SEE
 786. TEXT AT 762, 763, 764, 765, 578.], SECONDLY, A RE-APPLICATION (WHICH
 SUGGESTS USE OF CSA, s. 67(3) [97.], OR OPERATIONALLY SIMILAR TO), WHEREBY
 THE COURTS' IMPOSED NPP DATE (CALCULATED PER 'COURTS' IMPOSED SENTENCE'), HAS
 NOT SHIFTED ACTUAL CALCULATED DATE, WHICH IS WHAT CSA, s. 67(3) ATTACHES TO,
 787. AND SO TO SUBMIT ANY MORE PAROLE-RELEASE APPLICATIONS' WOULD VIOLATE DUE

788. PROCESS ASSOCIATED WITH OBSERVED COMPETENT LAW, WHICH THEREFORE INVALIDATES ALL ⁶ ADDITIONAL/FURTHER APPLICATIONS FOR PAROLE-RELEASE⁹ IF ATTACHED TO A SINGLE COURT IMPOSED NPP DATE, WHICH HAS NOT BEEN MOVED BY COMPETENT COURT, TO AN ⁶ "EXTENDED/INCREASED"⁹ [38. AND 45.], NPP DATE (WHICH WOULD THEN, AS A NEW
789. NPP DATE, INCUR ATTACHMENT FROM CSA, 67(3) [97.], AND, WHERE CSA, S. 67(9)(C) IDENTIFIES 'TYPE OF FUTURE PAROLE APPLICATION' AS "FURTHER APPLICATION BY PRISONER FOR RELEASE ON PAROLE."⁹, WHEN MAKING REFERENCE TO WATSON [194. (PARA. 1, IN FULL FROM JUDGMENT)], "FURTHER APPLICATION" IS SPECIFICALLY MEANING ⁶ RE-APPLICATION AND STILL ATTACHED TO SAME SINGLE COURT IMPOSED NPP DATE⁹, WHICH THEREFORE ALSO MEANS THAT AT TIME OF 5TH OPERATION OF CSA, S. 67(9) BY BOARD (AGAINST WATSON), WATSON IN FACT HAD 5. ACTIVE PAROLE-RELEASE APPLICATIONS 'STILL IN-PLAY' (WHICH IS
791. IMPROPER) [SEE TEXT AT 762. IBID.], AND, WHEN MAKING REFERENCE TO ANDREWS [207. (PARA. 17. (IN FULL FROM JUDGMENT)), "ON 22 JUNE 2006, 11 SEPTEMBER 2007 AND 17 JUNE 2008 HE APPLIED FOR PAROLE, BUT HIS APPLICATIONS WERE EACH REFUSED BY THE PAROLE BOARD."⁹], "FURTHER APPLICATION" IS SPECIFICALLY MEANING ⁶ RE-APPLICATION AND STILL ATTACHED TO SAME SINGLE COURT IMPOSED NPP DATE⁹, WHICH THEREFORE ALSO MEANS THAT AT TIME OF 3RD OPERATION OF CSA, S. 67(9) BY BOARD (AGAINST ANDREWS), ANDREWS IN FACT HAD 3. ACTIVE PAROLE-RELEASE APPLICATIONS 'STILL IN-PLAY' (WHICH IS IMPROPER) [SEE TEXT AT 762. IBID.], FOR THESE ABOVE REASONS, AS
792. DESCRIBED, ONE COURT'S NPP DATE DESIGNATED AS DATE A., INCURS INTRINSIC ATTACHMENT BY CSA, S. 67(3) [97.] (AS A SINGLE USE ONLY OF, FOR THE STRICT
793. PURPOSE OF PAROLE-RELEASE APPLICATION CSA, S. 67. [94.], AND ⁶ ONCE SAID PAROLE-RELEASE APPLICATION IS SUBMITTED TO BOARD [94.], ATTACHED TO DATE A., THERE IS NO COMPETENT JURISDICTION HELD BY ANY STATE GOVERNMENT ENTITY OPERATING FROM WITHIN CORRECTIONAL SERVICES ACT [85., 86. AND 94.], WHICH CAN REQUEST OR DIRECT ANY LIFER TO RE-APPLY FOR PAROLE RELEASE ⁶ AT A LATER DATE (CSA, S. 67(9)(C))⁹, AFTER BOARD ITSELF, OR EVEN ANY EVENT
794. [SEE TEXT AT 737. IBID.], WHICH BOARD PARTICIPATES IN (IN 'ANY' WAY, WHEREBY

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STATE GOVERNMENT AND/OR ITS AGENTS, INCLUDING [29.], 'IN FACT REJECT SAID RESPECTIVE LIFER'S CURRENT PAROLE-RELEASE SUBMISSION, CONSEQUENTIAL TO WHICH, STATE GOVERNMENT AND ITS AGENTS FUNCTION, OPERATE, THEN ENFORCE MATERIAL OPERATIONAL EFFECTS OF CSA, SS. 67(9), 67(9)(A), 67(9)(B), 67(9)(C), 67(10)', REJECTS/INVALIDATES SAID LIFER'S ~~CURRENT~~ CURRENT PAROLE-RELEASE APPLICATION, AND STIPULATED 'LATER DATE' CSA, S. 67(9)(C) IS STILL ATTACHED TO DATE A. (AND INTRINSIC ATTACHMENT BY CSA, S. 67(3), WHICH IS MARRIED TO CSA, S. 67(6), AND WHICH IS MARRIED TO CSA, S. 67(9), AND WHICH IS STILL MARRIED TO CSA, S. 67(10)), MEANING THAT THE COURT'S DESIGNATED NPP DATE (STIPULATED AS DATE A.), STILL EXISTS, BUT THROUGH ACTIVITY BY STATE GOVERNMENT, UNDER CH. II [3.] OPERATIONS, BOARD FRAUDULENTLY CLAIMS JURISDICTION TO 'SET ASIDE COURT'S IMPOSED DATE A. AND SUBSTITUTE/REPLACE DATE A. WITH BOARD'S OWN CREATION OF A NPP SENTENCE, WHICH IS IN FACT ILLEGAL/UNCONSTITUTIONAL',

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YET BOARD COMMITTED SAID ACTS AGAINST WATSON [194.] AND ANDREWS EVEN THOUGH THEIR RESPECTIVE DATE A.'S STILL EXIST", AND REMAINS OPERATIONALLY ATTACHED TO CSA, S. 67(3) WHICH IS A 'SINGLE USE PROVISION' OF THE CSA, UNTIL COMPETENT COURT CREATES AND IMPOSES (PER [45.]), AN "EXTENDED"

797.

[38.] AND THEREFORE NEW NPP, AT WHICH TIME 'THE COURT (CH. III [3.]), WILL ^{VOID} ~~DATE A.~~ DATE A. (DESIGNATED NPP DATE), AND EMPOWER DATE B. AND THAT

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NEWLY IMPOSED NPP DATE WILL THEN INCUR INTRINSIC ATTACHMENT TO BY CSA, S. 67(3) [97.], WHICH WILL THEREAFTER SPECIFICALLY ATTACH TO THE NEW DESIGNATED NPP DATE, IDENTIFIED AS DATE B.' (AND THE CYCLE OF ENGAGEMENT OF 'SINGLE-USE PROVISION' CSA, S. 67(3), WILL START AGAIN), SO AT

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POINT OF FACT [SEE TEXT AT 782. IBID.], PROVISION CSA, S. 67(3) ATTACHED TO DATE A, CAN ONLY EVER BE ACTIONED ONCE (BY A LIFER), IT CAN ONLY EVER ATTACH TO SAID SPECIFIC DATE A, AND, PER DESCRIPTION AT TEXT 781. IBID, IS ALL THAT IS REQUIRED BY LIFER FROM WHICH THE STATE MUST GRANT PAROLE-RELEASE, AND ANY ATTEMPT BY THE STATE TO CLAIM ANY OTHER LINE OF DUE PROCESS, IS FRAUDULENT", AND AS ALREADY HIGHLIGHTED ~~SEVERAL~~ SEVERAL TIMES

800.

HEREIN, RELATING TO THE THREE CONSTITUTIONALLY COMPETENT AVENUES OF

801. JURISDICTIONALLY COMPLIANT DUE PROCESS FOR A LIFER TO BE GRANTED PAROLE-
RELEASE [SEE TEXT AT 578, 729, 730, 731, 732.], IF SAID LIFER COMPLIES
WITH THE IMPROPER/ILLEGAL 'NOTIFICATION' (CSA. S. 67(9)), FROM THE
BOARD, PERTAINING TO ANY FUTURE APPLICATION BY LIFER FOR PAROLE-RELEASE
[SEE TEXT AT 765. IBID.], THEN SAID LIFER'S FUTURE APPLICATION/S ARE IMPROPER
AND OUTSIDE DUE PROCESS OF COMPETENT LAW, WHICH THEN RETURNS TO THE
802. ISSUE BEING HIGHLIGHTED AT TEXT 737, AN 'EVENT' (IBID), AND AT TEXT 748,
749, 750, 751. (IBID), AND SO THE 'EVENT' OF BOARD CREATING THAT WHICH IS
'NOTIFIED IN WRITING TO THE LIFER' (CSA. S. 67(9)), CONSEQUENTIAL ACTION,
THEN CSA. S. 67(9)(C) 'FAKE SENTENCE', ARE WHAT IS JURISDICTIONALLY
FRAUDULENT/ERRONEOUS [65, 82. AND 83.], AND MUST BE EXPUNGED/REPAIRED
FROM 'ALIEN OPERATIONAL EFFECT' I, AND FOR COMPARATIVE QUALIFICATION,
803. SAID LIFER EITHER COMPLIES WITH DUE PROCESS PER COMPETENT LAW (AND THOUGH
804. SAID LIFER MAY WISH TO SO COMPLY [SEE TEXT AT 765. IBID.], THEY CAN'T IF
STATE GOVERNMENT DOES NOT COMPLY WITH COURT JURISDICTIONAL AUTHORITY TO
IMPOSE SENTENCE, FROM WHICH STATE GOVERNMENT MUST ENFORCE SENTENCE
[45. AND 38.], WHICH WOULD THEN PERMIT AND ENABLE SAID LIFER TO OBSERVE
805. COMPETENT DUE PROCESS), OR, SAID LIFER COMPLIES WITH BOARD'S ORDER PER
'NOTIFICATION' (CSA. S. 67(9)), AND IF SO THEN 'CAN'T ALSO COMPLY WITH DUE
PROCESS PER COMPETENT LAW', AS DESCRIBED AT TEXT 578. IBID, 'THREE DUE
PROCESS AVENUES', OR, 'DOES NOT COMPLY WITH DUE PROCESS PER COMPETENT
LAW BUT DOES COMPLY WITH BOARD'S ORDER (CSA. S. 67(9)(C))', AND THIS ALSO
MEANS STATE GOVERNMENT (CH. II [3.]), PER FORCE OF CSA. SS. 67(9),
67(9)(C), IS CRIMINALLY ABUSING ITS AUTHORITY (CH. II [3.]), TO FORCE A
LIFER TO ENGAGE IN/PARTICIPATE IN/BE AN ACCESSORY TO AN ILLEGAL ACTION,
WHICH IS THE OPERATIONAL CONSEQUENCE/OBSERVANCE/ENGAGEMENT OF
806. CSA. S. 67(9) AGAINST RESPECTIVE LIFER', SO, 'ONCE AGAIN POINTING TO THE
QUALIFYING FACT IN COMPETENT LAW, THAT CSA. S. 67(9) HAS ABSOLUTELY
NO COMPETENT JURISDICTIONAL LINK TO CSA. SS. 67, 67(1), 67(2), 67(3),
67(6), 67(7) [REDACTED] WITH REGARD TO ANY LIFER APPLYING FOR PAROLE-

813.

MUST BE ADHERED TO, AND COMPLIED WITH, AND ENFORCED BY STATE GOVERNMENT (UNDER CH. II [3.]), AND SO 'THEIR OPERATIONAL ENFORCEMENT OF' ('THE WORDS' OF THE COURT IMPOSING SENTENCE, PLUS, THE REAL EFFECT APPLICATION OF 'THE WORDS' BY STATE GOVERNMENT, UNDER CH. II [3.] AUTHORITY AND JURISDICTION, TO 'CARRY OUT' THE 'WORDS OF THE SENTENCE IMPOSED'), BECOMES AN AMALGAMATION OF JURISDICTIONAL ASPECTS FROM WHICH THE 'GOVERNMENT CANNOT REMOVE OR INCREASE PENALTY OF SENTENCE IMPOSED (BY THE SENTENCING COURT)', WHEREBY

814.

A 'CONSTITUTIONALLY UNBREAKABLE LINK', FOR THE ENTIRE DURATION OF OPERATIONAL ENFORCEMENT OF SAID LIFER'S SENTENCE, PER OBSERVANCE OF ALL RELEVANT COMPETENT LAW, ENSURES THAT SENTENCING COURT (ONLY), UNDER CH. III [3.], OPERATES CLSA [34. AND 45.] TO IMPOSE ('THE WORDS' OF THE RESPECTIVE LIFER'S SENTENCE [84.]), SENTENCE OF RESPECTIVE DEFENDANT UPON THEM (NOW CLASSIFYING DEFENDANT AS A LIFER), AND THEREAFTER BEING A LIFER WITH A 'COURT IMPOSED SENTENCE', THEN, 'THE WORDS' OF SENTENCING COURT (WHEN TRANSCRIPTED INTO EVIDENCE OF THE COURT'S SPOKEN WORD), HAVE ATTRACTED UNTO THEM THE 'ABSOLUTE JURISDICTIONAL LINK' TO THE OPERATION

815.

OF CH. II [3.] (WHICH CAN ONLY BE FOR THE VERY STRICT AND SPECIFIC PURPOSE OF 'OPERATIONAL ENFORCEMENT / THE CARRYING OUT' OF SAID 'COURT IMPOSED SENTENCE',

816.

AND WITHIN JURISDICTIONAL AUTHORITY OF CH. II [3.], THE COMPETENT STATUTE SPECIFICALLY DEDICATED TO 'GOVERNING AND OVERSIGHT OF OPERATIONAL ENFORCEMENT / THE CARRYING-OUT OF SUCH IMPOSED SENTENCES UPON SAID LIFERS,

817.

IS CSA [85.], WHICH ITSELF CAN ONLY BE OPERATED BY A CH. II [3.] STATUTORY BODY (IN THIS CASE SUCH A BODY IS THE "STATE INSTRUMENTALITY" ([33.]) OF THE DEPARTMENT FOR CORRECTIONAL SERVICES (SOUTH AUSTRALIA)), UNDER MINISTERIAL PORTFOLIO OF CORRECTIONAL SERVICES, WHICH THEREFORE RESTRICTS ALL

818.

OPERATIONAL ACTIVITIES OF THE CSA [85.], TO THOSE WHICH CAN ONLY BE PERFORMED WITHIN THE REALM OF CH. II [3.], AND SUCH CH. II [3.] RESTRICTION ALSO PROHIBITS ANY ACTIVITY (INCLUDING 'DECISION MAKING'), WHICH 'BREACHES CH. II [3.] JURISDICTION', ALSO, WHEN ANY SUCH ACTIVITY ENCROACHES UPON CH. I ~~OR~~ CH. III [3.] REALMS'), AS THE REALM OF CH. II [3.]

819.

820.

IS THE ONLY CONSTITUTIONALLY [1.] PERMITTED ARENA (BETWEEN CH. I, CH. II AND CH. III [3.]), FROM WHICH AND BY WHICH SAID COURT IMPOSED SENTENCE CAN LAWFULLY BE OPERATIONALLY ENFORCED (AS THE ENFORCEMENT OF SAID LIFER'S IMPOSED SENTENCE FALLS WITHIN THE "EXECUTIVE POWER... TO ADMINISTER... AND CARRY OUT THE BUSINESS OF GOVERNMENT..." [3.], WHICH IS THE REALM OF CH. II [3.] ONLY, AND FOR THIS REASON, WHEN A CUSTODIAL TERM IS IMPOSED UPON A LIFER (AS INDICATED ABOVE), THERE IS AN AUTOMATIC AND MANDATORY OPERATIONAL LINK SPECIFICALLY ASSOCIATED WITH SAID IMPOSED SENTENCE, BETWEEN CH. II [3.] (WHO MUST 'ENFORCE/CARRY OUT' IMPOSED SENTENCE, WHICH WAS IMPOSED BY THE COMPETENT COURT), AND CH. III [3.] (WHO IMPOSED SAID SENTENCE UPON RESPECTIVE ^{LIFER} [194. (PARA. 11.)], WHERE SENTENCE INCLUDES ANY NPP ALSO

821.

STIPULATED BY THE SENTENCING COURT), AND FROM WHICH THE STATE GOVERNMENT OPERATING CH. II [3.] PURPOSE AND FUNCTION, CANNOT BREAK FREE OF (UNTIL SATISFACTION OF ENTIRE IMPOSED COURT'S SENTENCE), CANNOT REFUSE TO BE A PART OF

822.

(AS THE CONSTITUTION [1.] CREATES THIS 'AUTOMATIC AND MANDATORY OPERATIONAL LINK', WHICH GOVERNMENT DOES NOT HAVE JURISDICTION TO 'EXCEED AUTHORITY OF' ([1.] IS THE PARENT OF CH. I, CH. II AND CH. III [3.], AND HAS ABSOLUTE AUTHORITY OVER SAME)), AS SAID 'ABSOLUTE JURISDICTIONAL LINK' HAS BEEN CREATED AND EMPOWERED BY [1.] FOR THE PURPOSE OF 'ENFORCING/CARRYING OUT' THE ORDER OF THE COURT (THE IMPOSED SENTENCE), AGAINST AND UPON THE

823.

RESPECTIVE LIFER, AND, IT IS ALSO A CONSEQUENCE OF THE VERY STRICT REQUIREMENT OF THE 'SEPARATION OF POWER BETWEEN CH. II AND CH. III' [3.], THAT SUCH 'AUTOMATIC AND MANDATORY OPERATIONAL LINK' EXISTS AT ALL),

824.

AND SAID 'AUTOMATIC AND OPERATIONAL LINK' IS 'AUTOMATIC' AS A CONSEQUENCE OF THE COURT IMPOSING CUSTODIAL SENTENCE UPON RESPECTIVE LIFER, THEREBY CONSEQUENTING OPERATION AND APPLICATION OF RELEVANT STATUTE CONCERNING SENTENCE OF INCARCERATION [85.], AND, THE "STATE INSTRUMENTALITY" [33.] 'TO EFFECT', 'OVERSEE AND 'CARRY OUT' SAID TERM OF INCARCERATION (WITH ALL RELEVANT JURISDICTION TO DO SO, AS ~~THE~~ AFFORDED BY [1. AND 3. (CH. II.)]), IS CORRECTIONAL SERVICES DEPARTMENT, WHICH ALSO ~~MEANS~~ MEANS, DUE TO

825. SAID 'AUTOMATIC AND MANDATORY OPERATIONAL LINK' [SEE TEXT AT 822. IBID], THAT THE ONLY JURISDICTIONALLY 'COMPETENT MECHANISMS' FOR CARRYING-OUT SUCH A SENTENCE OF IMPOSED INCARCERATION (BY THE SENTENCING COURT, UPON A LIFER), ARE 'EMPLOYEES/AGENTS OF THE SOUTH AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT WHO PARTICIPATE IN THE APPLICATION OF CORRECTIONAL SERVICES ACT [85.], UPON/AGAINST SPECIFIC LIFER', 'THE CORRECTIONAL SERVICES ACT [85.]', 'CRIMINAL LAW CONSOLIDATION ACT [31.]', 'DEPARTMENT FOR CORRECTIONAL SERVICES' (AS THE GOVERNING/DIRECTING AGENCY/DEPARTMENT/ENTITY WITHIN WHICH THE OFFICIAL DECISIONS ARE MADE ON BEHALF OF SOUTH AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT, SO AS TO EFFECT THE ENFORCING OF/CARRYING-OUT OF SAID ~~■~~ SENTENCE OF IMPOSED INCARCERATION), 'CRIMINAL LAW (SENTENCING) ACT [84.]' (AS OBSERVED AT ALL TIMES BY DEPARTMENT FOR CORRECTIONAL SERVICES, WHILST DEPARTMENT (AND THE STATE GOVERNMENT), ENFORCE SAID IMPOSED
826. SENTENCE UPON RESPECTIVE LIFER, AND DONE SO UNDER THE JURISDICTION (AND RELATIVE 'RESTRICTIONS' [SEE TEXT AT 818. IBID]), OF CH. II [3.], BECAUSE CLSA [84.] INCLUDES FUNDAMENTAL COMPONENTS/PROVISIONS, CERTIFIED BY PARLIAMENT AND [29.], WHICH MUST (PER DUE PROCESS COMPLIANCE [65., 82. AND 83.]), BE OBSERVED, FOLLOWED, COMPLIED WITH AT ALL TIMES RELATING TO 'PENALTY OF IMPOSED SENTENCE UPON A LIFER', AND, 'HOW THE STATE GOVERNMENT MUST ACT IF IT WISHES TO/SEEKS TO ACHIEVE AN INCREASE TO A LIFER'S EXISTING COURT IMPOSED NPP [38. AND 45.]',
827. AND REVERSELY, DUE TO STATUTORY OPERATION OF CLSA [84.] WHEN DONE WITHIN ARENA OF A CRIMINAL LAW SENTENCING COURT (AS THE ONLY CONSTITUTIONALLY [1. AND 3.] COMPETENT ENTITY PERMITTED TO INCREASE/EXTEND (* WHICH MUST FIRST 'VACATE/VOID/NULLIFY/EXPUNGE' EXISTING IMPOSED NON-PAROLE PERIOD BEFORE ANY REPLACEMENT NPP CAN LAWFULLY BE IMPOSED, WHICH ONLY JUDGES OF SUPREME COURT RANK, SITING CRIMINAL LAW SENTENCING COURT ARENA (OR OF HIGHER RANK THAN SUPREME COURT, OF THE STATE, SUCH AS HCA)), PENALTY/EFFECT OF A COURT IMPOSED NPP), IF, AFTER RECEIVING SUCH AN 'APPLICATION' FROM SOUTH AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT, TO 'INCREASE/EXTEND EXISTING NPP', THE COURT
828. OF ~~■~~ COMPETENT JURISDICTION 'REJECTS SAID APPLICATION', THEN, NOT ONLY HAS THE GOVERNMENT APPLIED RELEVANT STATUTE (TO INCREASE NPP [34. AND 38.]
829. 830. 831. 832.

833. PURSUANT TO AND IN COMPLIANCE WITH DUE PROCESS ACCORDING TO COMPETENT LAW), AND FAILED TO ACHIEVE ITS DESIRED/INTENDED RESULT ('NPP INCREASE'), SAID 'APPLICATION' (CONSEQUENTIAL TO ITS FAILURE), PER COURT'S JUDGMENT, THEREAFTER HAS A REINFORCED EXISTING NPP (AS COURT'S DETERMINATION IS TO NOT INCREASE/EXTEND EXISTING NPP), WHICH MUST BE ACCEPTED BY
834. STATE GOVERNMENT AS THE FIXED NPP DATE, AND, MUST OBSERVE INTRINSIC RIGHTS OF RESPECTIVE LIFER WHEN LIFER APPLIES FOR PAROLE-RELEASE (PURSUANT TO CSA PAROLE-APPLICATION DUE PROCESS PROVISIONS, WHICH ARE SPECIFICALLY ANCHORED TO THE SENTENCING STANDARDS APPLIED BY RESPECTIVE LIFER'S SENTENCING COURT, WHEN LIFER'S SENTENCE IS IMPOSED UPON THEM BY SAID COMPETENT COURT)', WHICH IS SIGNIFICANT ALSO BECAUSE IT FURTHER REINFORCES THE POINTS
835. FEATURED AT TEXT 779, 780, 781, 782. IBID, BEING THAT PAROLE-RELEASE OF LIFER WITH IMPOSED NPP (BY THE COURT), MUST BE 'PAROLE-RELEASED AT AROUND STIPULATED DATE OF COURT IMPOSED NPP' (IF LIFER SUBMITS PAROLE APPLICATION PER CSA, s. 67(3) [97.]), THOUGH IRRESPECTIVE OF WHEN SUCH LIFER APPLIES FOR PAROLE RELEASE, PROVIDING PAROLE CONDITIONS ARE AGREED TO BY LIFER (AND ALL BACKSTOP CRITERIA ARE MET, INCLUDING SUGGESTED ACCOMMODATION LOCATION BEING SUITABLE), PAROLE-RELEASE CANNOT LAWFULLY BE DENIED/REFUSED (BY SOUTH AUSTRALIAN PAROLE BOARD), TO LIFER WITH NPP, BY ANY DIRECT ACTION OF THE BOARD,
836. NOR BY ^{ANY} CONSEQUENTIAL EFFECT BORNE FROM AN ACTION DONE BY THE BOARD (AS DESCRIBED ABOVE, BOARD HAS NO JURISDICTION TO DIRECTLY APPLY CSA, s. 67(9) AGAINST SUITABLE LIFER, NOR JURISDICTION TO ASSIST CABINET/STATE GOVERNMENT (BEING ACCESSORY BEFORE THE FACT), TO CREATE AN ILLEGALLY CREATED DECISION (BY EXECUTIVE COUNCIL/CABINET [29.]), CONSEQUENTIAL TO WHICH THE BOARD THEN ACTS AS ACCESSORY AFTER THE FACT, TO ILLEGALLY CREATE DECISION CSA, s. 67(9)(C), WHICH IT THEN ILLEGALLY IMPOSES UPON AND AGAINST RESPECTIVE LIFER, AND, ILLEGALLY NOTIFIES SAID LIFER (WHO IS REFUSED BY CABINET), IN WRITING (CSA, s. 67(9)), OF THE ILLEGALLY CREATED AND IMPOSED NEW NON-PAROLE PERIOD OF TIME [SEE TEXT AT 748, 749, 750. IBID]], AND, SAID 'COMPETENT MECHANISMS' CAN (ONLY OPERATING IN COMBINED EFFECT SO AS TO ACHIEVE THEIR RESPECTIVE
- 837.

838. INTENDED ACTION [SEE TEXT AT 811. IBID], AS AN AMALGAM, TO EFFECT ENFORCEMENT OF COURT'S IMPOSED SENTENCE (WHICH WAS IMPOSED BY THE COURT, WITHIN REALM OF CH. III [3. AND 45.]), THE 'CARRYING-OUT OF SENTENCE' [SEE TEXT AT 813. IBID]), ONLY BE ACTED UPON, USED, APPLIED, ETC. WITHIN THE REALM OF CH. II [3.], AND SO, 'ANY 'FORMAL DECISIONS' MADE BY AGENTS OF THE STATE GOVERNMENT WHICH AFFECT RESPECTIVE LIFER IN ANY WAY, WHICH, BY GOVERNMENT'S OPERATION (UNDER CH. II [3.]), OF 'CREATES/CONSEQUENCES AN EFFECT WHEREBY RESPECTIVE LIFER 'INCURS/SUFFERS' FROM SUCH 'FORMAL DECISION', AND WHERE SAID 'INCURSION/SUFFERING' IS AN EFFECT DIRECTLY CONSEQUENTIAL TO SAID 'FORMAL DECISION' BEING MADE 'OUT OF COMPETENT JURISDICTION', AND THEREFORE
839. NOT LAWFULLY MADE, ULTRA VIRES' (IF A 'FORMAL DECISION' IS MADE WITHIN THE JURISDICTIONAL BOUNDARIES OF COMPETENCE, THEN 'DECISION' IS LAWFULLY MADE AND MADE 'INSIDE OF COMPETENT JURISDICTION', BUT, ALL 'FORMAL DECISIONS' MADE WHICH EXCEED THEIR ASSIGNED JURISDICTIONAL BOUNDARIES OF COMPETENCE, ARE 'DECISIONS' UNLAWFULLY MADE AND MADE 'OUT OF COMPETENT JURISDICTION'), SAID CREATED 'SUFFERING' (INCLUDING INCURSION INTO DUE PROCESS FROM WHICH SAID LIFER HAS STOLEN FROM THEM, BY PARTY MAKING SAID 'FORMAL DECISION', LIFER'S PROTECTION OF THEIR RIGHTS (RIGHTS WHICH ARE GUARDED AND OBSERVED BY COMPLIANCE WITH DUE PROCESS ACCORDING TO COMPETENT LAW), BASICALLY, IF DUE PROCESS IS NOT COMPLIED WITH, THEN ACTIONS THEREAFTER ARE NOT LAWFULLY
840. MADE, 'SUCH AS WHEN BOARD ILLEGALLY IMPOSES A 'NEW NON-PAROLE PERIOD OF TIME' [SEE TEXT AT 836. IBID], UPON A LIFER, WHICH RESULTED FROM THE BOARD EFFECTING 'INCURSION' INTO DUE PROCESS [SEE TEXT AT 747, 748, 749, 750. IBID.], WHICH THEREBY DENIES LIFER THE DUE PROCESS PROTECTION WITHIN STATE'S APPLICATION TO THE COURT [38.], HENCE 'STOLEN DUE PROCESS RIGHTS', AND SO THEREAFTER 'OUT OF COMPETENT JURISDICTION'), IS ILLEGALLY PERPETRATED
841. BY AGENTS OF SOUTH AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT OPERATING FROM WITHIN DEPARTMENT FOR CORRECTIONAL SERVICES, UNDER FRAUDULENT USE OF CSA, [85. AND 86.], AND ILLEGALLY ASSISTED BY SOUTH AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT, THEREBY CRIMINALLY VIOLATING CH. II [3.] CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY [1.], AND
842. 843.

EXCEEDING CH. II JURISDICTION [3.], BREAKING THE 'JURISDICTIONAL LINK' BETWEEN CH. II AND CH. III [3.] [SEE TEXT AT 814, 815, 816, IBID], BREACHING REALM RESTRICTIONS OF CH. II [3.] [SEE TEXT AT 818. ■ IBID], WHICH MUST BE PROMPTLY STOPPED FROM HAVING ANY FURTHER 'INFLUENCE' UPON THE VICTIM OF ITS 'OPERATIONAL EFFECT' ALSO, WHERE 'VICTIM' IS RESPECTIVE LIFER, SAID 'INFLUENCE' WOULD BE REFUSAL BY STATE GOVERNMENT TO GRANT PAROLE-RELEASE TO RESPECTIVE LIFER, AND 'OPERATIONAL EFFECT' IS CONTINUING INCARCERATION AND NEW NON-PAROLE PERIOD OF TIME WITHIN WHICH RESPECTIVE LIFER CANNOT APPLY FOR OR RECEIVE PAROLE-RELEASE (SO 'DECISION' DESCRIBED AT TEXT 838, IBID, BEING BOARD OPERATING CSA, s. 67(9) AGAINST LIFER, MUST BE OVERTURNED AND PAROLE-RELEASE EFFECTED), AND RETURNING TO TEXT AT 810, 811, 812, 813, 814, IBID, THE 'OPERATIONAL ENFORCEMENT OF' CAN ONLY BE LAWFULLY PERFORMED ^{WITHIN} CH. II [3.], 'THE WORDS' OF SENTENCE JUDGMENT CAN ONLY BE LAWFULLY CREATED WITHIN CH. III [3.], THE 'CONSTITUTIONALLY UNBREAKABLE LINK' BETWEEN CREATION OF SENTENCE (CH. III [3.]), AND ENFORCEMENT OF/CARRYING-OUT OF SUCH SENTENCE (CH. II [3.]), IS THE OBSERVANCE OF 'SEPARATION OF POWERS BETWEEN CH. II AND CH. III' [3.], THE 'ABSOLUTE JURISDICTIONAL LINK' BETWEEN CH. III ([3.]), CREATOR OF SENTENCE AND CH. II ([3.]), ENFORCER OF SENTENCE, PROVIDES THE HIGHEST AUTHORITY NEEDED ([1.]), TO ENABLE SOUTH AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT UNDER CH. II JURISDICTION, TO EFFECT 'OPERATIONAL ENFORCEMENT' [SEE TEXT AT 813, IBID] OF IMPOSED SENTENCE OF INCARCERATION, BUT, THE 'AJL' WHICH FUNCTIONS UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF THE 'CUL', ONLY OPERATES WITH ITS ASSIGNED JURISDICTIONAL COMPETENCE IF 'PROPER SEPARATION OF POWERS' BETWEEN CH. I, CH. II AND CH. III [3.] IS LAWFULLY AND WHOLELY OBSERVED [3.] (EXAMPLES OF A FAILURE TO OBSERVE 'PROPER SEPARATION OF POWERS', IS 'WHEN BOARD OPERATES CSA, s. 67(9) AGAINST SPECIFIC LIFER', 'BOARD REFUSES PAROLE-RELEASE OF SPECIFIC LIFER (WITHIN CSA, s. 67(6)), THEN DIRECTLY APPLIES CSA, s. 67(9) RATHER THAN APPLY [38. AND 45.]', 'BOARD CREATES A PERIOD OF TIME WHICH OPERATIONALLY EQUATES TO A 'NEW NON-PAROLE PERIOD OF TIME' (INSTEAD OF ONLY COMPETENT COURT CREATING SAID PERIOD OF TIME)', AND QUITE

849.

SERIOUS EXAMPLE OF FAILURE TO ~~SEE~~ OBSERVE PROPER SEPARATION OF POWERS IN COMPANY WITH 'ILLEGAL APPLICATION OF STATUTE (CSA.) TO SPECIFIC LIFERS', IS

850.

WHEN PARLIAMENT PASSED CLSA AND CSA AMENDMENTS, THEN [15.] TO CERTIFY [46.], WHEREIN PROVISIONS SO AMENDED CAUSED AN OPERATIONAL EFFECT WHEREBY PREVIOUS STATUTORY MANDATE (DESCRIBED AT [123., 124., 125., 126., 127. AND 128.], AND IN ANDREWS [207. (PARA. 20, IN FULL FROM JUDGMENT)], AND [139. AND 137.]), WITHIN CSA AND INTRINSIC TO IMPOSED SENTENCE OF A LIFER WHO WAS SENTENCED PROPERLY AND COMPETENTLY, TO SENTENCING STANDARDS EXISTING BETWEEN 1983

851.

([139.]) AND COMMENCEMENT OF [46.] ON 1-8-1994, AND WHICH WERE LATER JUDICIALLY REINFORCED IN MURPHY [66. AND 72.], AND JARRETT [79., 78., 77. AND 80.], SAID LIFER HAD IMPOSED UPON THEM (AS PART OF THEIR SENTENCING ([194. (PARA. 11.)]), WITHIN CH. III [3.] AND PURSUANT TO AND COMPLIANT WITH [45.]), ACCRUED RIGHT TO 'REMISSIONS' AND 'AUTOMATIC PAROLE' (SEE [207.] ANDREWS JUDGMENT, PARAGRAPH 15, " ("THE AUTOMATIC PAROLE ACT") WAS IN OPERATION AT THE TIME OF HIS SENTENCING. PURSUANT TO THAT SECTION, THE PLAINTIFF HAD THE RIGHT TO REMISSIONS AND TO BE AUTOMATICALLY RELEASED ON PAROLE, SUBJECT TO CONDITIONS, AT THE EXPIRATION OF THE NON-PAROLE PERIOD SET BY THE COURT.", AND SEE MURPHY [72.], AND JARRETT [79. AND 80.]), AND AS MY 2002 JUDGMENT REINFORCES AT [79. AND 80.], THE SAME RIGHTS MUST

852.

BE APPLIED TO LIFER REGARDLESS OF WHEN SENTENCED (PRIOR TO OR AFTER 1-8-1994

853.

[46.]), AND SO, UPON SUCH SENTENCING, THE EFFECT OF [SEE TEXT AT 814, 815, 816, 817, 818, IBID], 'ABSOLUTE ~~SEE~~ JURISDICTIONAL LINK' COMMENCES BETWEEN CH. III [3.] SENTENCE CREATOR AND CH. II [3.] SENTENCE ENFORCER, NOT HOWEVER, BETWEEN CH. I AND CH. III [3.], OR BETWEEN CH. I AND

854.

CH. II [3.], THAT MEANS CH. II [3.] STATE GOVERNMENT MUST ONLY 'ENFORCE' PENALTY OF SENTENCE STRICTLY ACCORDING TO CH. III [3.]

855.

'IMPOSED' PENALTY OF SENTENCE, BUT, WHEN CH. I [3.] PARLIAMENT WITH ASSENT [15.], CHANGED STATUTE (CSA. [28.], CLSA [28.]), AND WROTE OUT OF STATUTE (CSA), ABOVE DESCRIBED ACCRUED RIGHTS (TO LIFERS), THE

856.

SOUTH AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT ILLEGALLY CREATED A FRAUDULENT LINK,

857. BETWEEN CH. I [3.] PARLIAMENT AND CH. II [3.] GOVERNMENT, AND ILLEGALLY
 858. VOIDED EXISTING COURT'S JUDGMENTS UPON LIFERS (IMPOSED PER CH. III [3.]),
 AND 'ILLEGALLY SUBSTITUTING COMPETENT LINK BETWEEN CH. III [3.] CREATOR
 859. OF SENTENCE, AND CH. II [3.] ENFORCER OF SENTENCE', WITH 'FRAUDULENT AND
 INCOMPETENT LINK BETWEEN CH. I [3.] THE NEW CREATOR AND IMPOSER OF
 SENTENCE, AND CH. II [3.] THE NEW ENFORCER OF NEWLY CREATED FAKE
 860. SENTENCE', WITH 'OPERATIONAL ENFORCEMENT OF' SAID FAKE SENTENCE
 THEREAFTER ILLEGALLY ACTIONED/APPLIED BY CH. II [3.], YET NO LONGER
 ENFORCING THE COURT'S IMPOSED SENTENCE, BECAUSE CH. II [3.] GOVERNMENT,
 PURSUANT TO ILLEGAL APPLICATION OF [46.], TRAMPLED ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL [1.]
 COMPETENCE OF THE SENTENCING COURT, ~~VOIDED~~ VOIDED 'PENALTY OF SENTENCE
 IMPOSED BY THE COURT', AND REPLACED WITH 'PENALTIES APPLICABLE TO A LIFER
 861. AS DESCRIBED STRICTLY WITHIN [46.]', EVEN THOUGH 'GOVERNMENT CANNOT REMOVE
 OR INCREASE PENALTY OF SENTENCE IMPOSED (BY THE SENTENCING COURT)' [SEE TEXT
 862. AT 813. IBID], SO, IF COURT DID NOT IMPOSE [46.] UPON RESPECTIVE LIFER, BUT
 LIFER HAD EXISTING SENTENCE IMPOSED, PURSUANT TO SENTENCING STANDARDS DESCRIBED
 IN ANDREWS [207. (PARAGRAPH 20, FROM JUDGMENT IN FULL)], BUT THEN CH. II
 [3.] GOVERNMENT STARTED ENFORCING [46.] AGAINST LIFER EVEN THOUGH COURT
 863. STILL HAS NOT IMPOSED [46.] UPON LIFER, THEN, LIFER HAS BEEN CRIMINALLY
 DENIED APPLICATION OF THEIR COURT IMPOSED SENTENCE, DENIED DUE PROCESS OF
 [38.] AND EFFECTIVELY RE-SENTENCED BY PARLIAMENT AND GOVERNMENT,
 AND NOT BY A COURT [3.], WHICH IS NOT ONLY ILLEGAL, IT IS
 UNCONSTITUTIONAL TO THE CRIMINAL STANDARD.

SUBSTANTIVE LAW AND RIGHTS VERSUS PROCEDURAL LAW AND RIGHTS

864. CONCERNING THE PAROLE APPLICATION PROCESS, BEFORE SUCH A PROCESS IS UNDERTAKEN BY A LIFER, IT IS ESSENTIAL TO KNOW WHAT THE RESPECTIVE LIFER APPLICANT
865. THINKS HE OR SHE HAS AN ENTITLEMENT TO ASK FOR. IT IS **ONE THING** TO KNOW WHAT SAID LIFER APPLICANT IS **ASKING FOR** (PAROLE RELEASE), AND **ANOTHER THING** TO ACCEPT WHEN AND WHY SAID LIFER APPLICANT IS ASKING FOR IT, AND **ANOTHER THING** TO UNDERSTAND WHAT RIGHTS ARE HELD BY SAID LIFER ASSOCIATED WITH SUCH APPLICATION, AND ALSO CRITICAL TO THE PROCESS IS THE SPECIFIC OBLIGATIONS UPON THE SOUTH AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT, PARTICULARLY WHAT IT **MAY DO**, WHAT IT **MUST DO**, WHERE AND WHAT IS THE 'AUTHORITY' TO DESCRIBE AND DEFINE SAME, AS WELL AS WHAT **LIMITS AND RESTRICTIONS** ARE HELD OVER AND IMPOSED UPON THE STATE GOVERNMENT, WHILST THE STATE GOVERNMENT RESPONDS TO AND PROCESSES SAID PAROLE APPLICATION.
866. THE FOUNDATION OF SAID LIFER'S PAROLE APPLICATION, IS THEIR 'BELIEF THAT THEY NOT ONLY HAVE A RIGHT **TO APPLY FOR PAROLE**, BUT THAT THEY ALSO HAVE A RIGHT **TO RECEIVE**
867. **PAROLE RELEASE**'. THE GENESIS FOR SUCH 'BELIEF' IS WHEN THEIR RESPECTIVE NON-PAROLE PERIOD IS IMPOSED UPON THEM, BY THE SENTENCING COURT, AND THEN CERTIFIED BY SAID
868. COURT INTO OFFICIAL RECORD. IT IS AT THAT POINT THAT THE RESPECTIVE LIFER HAS THE RIGHT TO START 'EXERCISING' THEIR 'IMPOSED SENTENCING RIGHTS', WHICH MUST INTRINSICALLY INCORPORATE NOT ONLY 'THOSE RIGHTS WHICH THE LIFER **MUST RECEIVE**' (FOR EXAMPLE, THE LIFER'S RIGHT TO **APPLY FOR PAROLE RELEASE**, AT A TIME/DATE RELEVANT TO THEIR COURT IMPOSED NON-PAROLE PERIOD), BUT ALSO THOSE RIGHTS WHICH THE SOUTH AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT **MUST COMPLY WITH**, AND, **MUST ENFORCE** (FOR EXAMPLE, STATE GOVERNMENT IS OBLIGATED TO ACCEPT WITHOUT CONTEST, THAT COURT IMPOSED NPP IS AN OBJECT WHICH CANNOT BE DATE SHIFTED, MOVED BACKWARDS/EXTENDED, BY ANY ACT BY ANY PERSON WITHIN CH. II [3.], IRRESPECTIVE OF POSITION OF EMPLOYMENT (INCLUDING PREMIER, ATTORNEY-GENERAL, PAROLE BOARD, ETC.), OR PLACE OF SEAT (INCLUDING MP 'IN' PARLIAMENT, PERSON 'IN' CABINET, ETC.)).

869. IT IS THE UNFORTUNATE CIRCUMSTANCE THOUGH, THAT THE STATE GOVERNMENT HAS EITHER FORGOTTEN ITS PLACE IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL CHAIN OF JURISDICTION [1. AND 3.], OR DOES NOT CARE SUFFICIENTLY ABOUT ITS TRUE JURISDICTION, INSTEAD, ACTS REGARDLESS OF COMPETENT AUTHORITY UNTIL (FOR EXAMPLE, A SUPERIOR COURT), JUDICIALLY ~~BE~~ TOLD TO DO SOMETHING DIFFERENTLY.

870. THE COMPETENT AND PERMITTED ACTIONS OF AND BY THE STATE GOVERNMENT, WITH REGARD TO LIFERS AND THEIR RESPECTIVE SENTENCES, IS DESCRIBED ABOVE [SEE TEXT AT 846 AND 847], AS 'CUL' AND 'AJL', AND EXPLAINED IN DETAIL BETWEEN ABOVE TEXT PARAGRAPHS 792 TO 845 (INCLUSIVE), AND 848 TO 863.

871. IT IS A SIGNIFICANT FEATURE OF A LIFER'S 'IMPOSED SENTENCING RIGHTS', TO NOT ONLY 'IDENTIFY WHAT THEIR SENTENCING RIGHTS ARE', BUT ALSO 'WHEN THEY ARE ABLE/

872. PERMITTED TO EXERCISE THEIR SAID RIGHTS'. PART OF IDENTIFYING 'WHAT' LIFER'S RESPECTIVE RIGHTS ARE, IS ALSO REALISING HOW SAID INDIVIDUAL SENTENCING RIGHTS ARE JUDICIALLY CLASSIFIED, MUST BE CLASSIFIED OR MAY BE CLASSIFIED, WHAT OTHER LAWS MAY BE INTRINSICALLY ATTACHED TO SAID SENTENCING RIGHTS, AND, HOW AND WHERE RESPECTIVE LIFER CAN PROTECT, ARGUE AND RE-ESTABLISH SAID (RELEVANT)

873. 'IMPOSED SENTENCING RIGHTS'. IT IS A FACT OF DUE PROCESS OBSERVANCE THAT PARLIAMENT (OPERATING ONLY WITHIN CH. I [1. AND 3.]), CANNOT 'SENTENCE A PERSON', OR 'INCARCERATE A PERSON', OR 'ENFORCE ANY IMPOSED CRIMINAL JURISDICTION SENTENCE AGAINST ANY PERSON', AS IT HAS NO COMPETENT JURISDICTION TO DO SO, ADDITIONALLY, EXECUTIVE GOVERNMENT WHICH IS THE GOVERNMENT OF THE DAY (OPERATING ONLY WITHIN CH. II [1. AND 3.]), CANNOT 'SENTENCE A PERSON', IT CAN 'INCARCERATE A PERSON' (RIGHT TO DO SO PURSUANT ONLY TO ITS AUTHORITY TO ENFORCE AN IMPOSED SENTENCE), IT CAN 'ENFORCE AN IMPOSED CRIMINAL JURISDICTION SENTENCE AGAINST A PERSON' (RIGHT TO DO SO PURSUANT ONLY TO ITS AUTHORITY TO ENFORCE AN IMPOSED SENTENCE), ADDITIONALLY, THE JUDICIARY, CRIMINAL LAW COURTS (OPERATING ONLY WITHIN CH. III [1. AND 3.]), CAN 'SENTENCE A PERSON', IT CAN 'INCARCERATE A PERSON' (RIGHT TO DO SO CONSEQUENTIAL TO CONVICTION (UNDER CRIMINAL LAW)), AND APPLICATION OF RESPECTIVE SENTENCING STANDARDS, AND PURSUANT ONLY TO ITS AUTHORITY TO ENFORCE AN IMPOSED SENTENCE), SO FAR AS TO ORDER COURT STAFF TO TAKE CUSTODY (IF SENTENCED PERSON IS NOT

ALREADY INCARCERATED), OF THE CONVICTED AND THEREAFTER SENTENCED PERSON UNTIL THE DELIVERY OF SAID PERSON INTO THE CUSTODY OF CORRECTIONAL SERVICES DEPARTMENT, IT CAN IMPOSE A CRIMINAL LAW JURISDICTION SENTENCE OF INCARCERATION AGAINST A PERSON, IT CAN ORDER/DIRECT THE EXECUTIVE GOVERNMENT TO ENFORCE ITS IMPOSED SENTENCE OF INCARCERATION (AGAINST A SENTENCED LIFER), WHICH INCLUDES WHEN EXECUTIVE GOVERNMENT MAKES A DECISION RELATING TO A SENTENCED AND STILL INCARCERATED LIFER, WHICH IN ITS EFFECTIVE OPERATION ACTUALLY EXCEEDS THE COMPETENT JURISDICTION AND AUTHORITY OF SENTENCE ENFORCEMENT, CONSEQUENTING ALSO, A CRIMINAL LAW JURISDICTION CREATION OF A SENTENCE INCREASE WITHOUT ANY CONSTITUTIONAL COMPETENCE TO SO ACT.

874. IT IS THE COURTS ALONE (CH. III [1. AND 3.]), WHICH HOLDS ABSOLUTE AUTHORITY TO INCREASE/EXTEND THE IMPOSED NON-PAROLE PERIOD OF A LIFER [198. (PARAS. 11, 28, 68.), 38, 40, 45, AND 84.], AND IT IS WORTH HIGHLIGHTING, WITH EMPHASIS,
875. SECTION 56. OF THE SENTENCING ACT [45.], AND TITLE NOTE OF SAME [84.], ESPECIALLY THE TEXT "... AND THE ENFORCEMENT OF SENTENCES", AND IS PROHIBITED FROM BEING ACTION AS A NPP INCREASE (WITH JURISDICTIONAL COMPETENCE), IF A PURPORTED INCREASE TO RESPECTIVE LIFER'S NPP HAS NOT BEEN PERFORMED BY A COMPETENT COURT, AND WITHIN STATUTORY PROCESSES PURSUANT TO RELEVANT SENTENCING STATUTE (AND ANY
876. RELEVANT CASE LAW RELATING TO SENTENCING A LIFER/INCREASING NPP). ABOVE IN THIS DOCUMENT I ~~DESCRIBED~~ DESCRIBED A 'FAKE SENTENCE', SUCH AS WHEN THE PAROLE BOARD CREATES A 'PERIOD OF TIME WITHIN WHICH A LIFER, APPLYING FOR PAROLE RELEASE, CAN'T APPLY FOR (RE-APPLY FOR), OR RECEIVE PAROLE FROM PAROLE BOARD' (EFFECTIVELY
877. A NON-PAROLE PERIOD OF TIME). THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS MENTION IS THAT MY 2002 COURT IMPOSED SENTENCE (MANDATING OPERATIONAL ENFORCEMENT BY STATE GOVERNMENT (CH. II [1. AND 3.]), OF 1992 SENTENCING STANDARDS [74., 77., 78. AND 80.]), ~~IN~~ IN, SO DOING IT ALSO CREATED, WITH DIRECT AND SPECIFIC REGARD TO ME, A SET OF CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH THEMSELVES INCORPORATED WITHIN, INTRINSICALLY, SAME, 'CUL' AND 'AJL'
878. [SEE TEXT AT 870. IBID]. IT IS BORNE FROM SAID 'CREATED CIRCUMSTANCES' (MY 2002 COURT IMPOSED SENTENCE (INCLUDING NPP SPECIFICALLY)), THAT MY 2002 SENTENCE ATTRACTS 'SUBSTANTIVE' AND 'PROCEDURAL' LAWS, RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS WHICH ARE SPECIFICALLY CONSEQUENTIAL TO THE COURT IMPOSED NPP [74.].

879. AT THE HEART OF MY COMPLAINT, THAT THE SOUTH AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT STOLE MY ACCRUED RIGHTS ASSOCIATED WITH MY COURT IMPOSED SENTENCE [74.], PARTICULARLY, THE CALCULATION OF MY 'PAROLE RELEASE DATE', AND, ATTACHED TO SAME IS THE OPERATIONAL EFFECT OF "AUTOMATIC PAROLE", WITH SAID TWO FEATURES BEING A STATUTORY CREATION [123., 124., 125., 126., 127., 128., 136., 137. AND 139.], WHICH, ONCE IMPOSED BY A COURT [3.], COULD ONLY BE EXCEEDED IN EFFECTIVE PENALTY (THE PENALTY EFFECT BEING WHAT WAS IMPOSED BY THE COURT AS A SENTENCE, NPP, PLUS, THE HEAD SENTENCE, THEREFORE ANY INCREASE/EXTENDING OF IMPOSED NPP WAS IN EFFECT A PENALTY INCREASE), BY A HIGHER COURT, AS A CONSTITUTIONAL PASSAGE OF DUE PROCESS.

880. TO APPRECIATE THE LEGAL CORRECTNESS IN MY COMPLAINT, IT WOULD SEEM FUNDAMENTAL TO KNOW WHAT RIGHTS I HAVE (CAUSE OF COMPLAINT/CAUSE OF ACTION), ASSOCIATED WITH SAME, WHAT LAWS EXIST TO 'DEFINE' SAID RIGHTS, TO 'GUARD' SAID RIGHTS, TO 'PROTECT' SAID RIGHTS, AND TO 'RE-ESTABLISH/ASSERT' SAID RIGHTS, AND 'WHERE IS THE ONLY CONSTITUTIONALLY COMPETENT PLACE TO FORMALLY ARGUE FOR PROTECTION OF SAID RIGHTS'.

881. I HAVE COMPLAINED THAT ACCRUED RIGHTS HAD BEEN STOLEN FROM ME, SO IT IS

882. PRUDENT TO KNOW 'WHAT IS AN ACCRUED RIGHT'? I HAVE ALSO COMPLAINED THAT

PROCEDURAL RIGHTS HAVE ALSO BEEN STOLEN FROM ME, SO THE ADDITIONAL QUESTION WOULD BE 'WHAT IS A PROCEDURAL RIGHT'? IN SIMPLE TERMS, SOMETHING 'ACCRUED' IS A THING WHICH CAN THEN BE GUARDED, PROTECTED, AND IF THE 'ACCRUED THING' IS ITSELF ABLE TO BE USED, OPERATED, APPLIED, EXERCISED, AT A PARTICULAR TIME (SUCH AS A RIGHT TO APPLY FOR PAROLE RELEASE AT (AFTER), A CERTAIN TIME/DATE), THEN AN 'ACCRUED RIGHT' (THE THING), WILL HAVE ANCHORED TO IT 'DUE PROCESS RIGHTS' ASSOCIATED WITH THE CORRECT PROCEDURES FOR ACTIONING, GUARDING, PROTECTING AND EXERCISING SUCH ACCRUED

884. RIGHTS. ACCRUED RIGHTS ARE EXERCISED BY OPERATION/APPLICATION OF PROCEDURAL LAW.

885. THE PINDER JUDGMENT [208.], APTLY EXPLAINS THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN 'ACCRUED RIGHTS', ALSO REGARDED AS 'SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS', AND, 'DUE PROCESS RIGHTS', ALSO

886. REGARDED AS 'PROCEDURAL RIGHTS'. WHAT IS CLEARLY EXPRESSED IN PINDER [208.], IS WHEN PINDER HAD THE 'SUBSTANTIVE RIGHT' (TO ARGUE 'TIME BAR IMMUNITY FROM LAYING OF INFORMATION AGAINST HIM'), EXERCISEABLE IN COURT (SO AS TO 'EXERCISE' HIS

- 'ACCRUED RIGHT' OF A TIME BAR IMMUNITY FROM PROSECUTION, IT MUST FIRST BE RECOGNISED BY THE COURT THE EFFECTIVE START DATE AFTER WHICH THE TIME BAR IMMUNITY BECOMES OPERATIONAL, EXERCISEABLE AND ENFORCEABLE BY THE CRIMINAL LAW COURTS'), AND FOR THAT REASON ('WHEN'), IT WAS A CRITICAL COMPONENT OF THE PROCEDURAL
887. LAWS (DUE PROCESS ACCORDING TO RELEVANT PROCESS LAWS), THAT BEFORE EXERCISING THE 'ACCRUED RIGHT' OF 'TIME BAR IMMUNITY' (SUBSTANTIVE RIGHT IS THE 'TIME BAR' ITSELF), THE COURT MUST ESTABLISH IF SAID ACCRUED RIGHT OF TIME BAR IMMUNITY, WAS IN FACT OPEN TO PINDER TO BE EXERCISED?
888. THE 'WHEN' ASPECT IN PINDER [208.], WAS THE PROCEDURAL RIGHT WHICH UNFORTUNATELY FOR PINDER WAS NOT AN ADVANTAGE TO HIM, DUE TO A STATUTE AMENDMENT WHICH BECAME OPERATIONALLY EFFECTIVE, AND ENFORCEABLE (PROCEDURAL LAW), BEFORE PINDER HAD REACHED THE DATE WHEN PINDER COULD EXERCISE HIS ACCRUED
889. RIGHT OF STATUTE BAR IMMUNITY, THEREFORE, ~~ALTHOUGH~~ PINDER HAD AN ACCRUED RIGHT (A 'SUBSTANTIVE RIGHT'), TO STATUTE BAR IMMUNITY, BUT PROCEDURAL RIGHTS (ACTIONED AS DUE PROCESS), ACTUALLY PROHIBITED PINDER FROM REACHING THE FIRST DATE WHEN HIS 'ACCURED RIGHT' WAS EXERCISEABLE.
890. CONSEQUENTIALLY, FOR PINDER [208.], THERE WAS NOT YET ANY PROCEDURAL LAW (DUE PROCESS), AVAILABLE TO HIM TO PERMIT ANY 'EXERCISE' OF 'TIME BAR' 'IMMUNITY' ('EXERCISE' (PROCEDURAL RIGHT), 'TIME BAR' (SUBSTANTIVE RIGHT), 'IMMUNITY' (SUBSTANTIVE RIGHT ARGUED VIA PROCEDURAL RIGHTS)), SO THE POINT TO MAKE IS THAT EVEN
891. THOUGH PINDER [208.], OR A LIFER LIKE ME [74.], MIGHT HAVE ACCRUED RIGHTS IMPOSED UPON US (AT THE SENTENCING STAGE), DEPENDING ON 'WHAT' THE RESPECTIVE ACCRUED RIGHT IS, WHICH ITSELF WILL ATTRACT DESIGNATED PROCEDURES RELEVANT TO SAME, THE POINT AT WHICH (THE START DATE OF), SUCH AN ACCURED RIGHT CAN BE IDENTIFIED, CHARACTERISED, GUARDED, PROTECTED, ESTABLISHED, RE-ESTABLISHED AND EXERCISED BECOMES A SIGNIFICANT FACTOR IN THE 'CHARACTER OF RESPECTIVE ACCRUED RIGHT'. IN PINDER [208.], THE 'CHARACTER' OF HIS ACCRUED RIGHT TO TIME BAR IMMUNITY, COULD BE PROPERLY DESCRIBED AS AN 'INACTIVE ACCRUED RIGHT PENDING DATE TO EXERCISE' (SAME), DUE TO PRE-REQUISITE CONDITION (BEING THAT PINDER MUST FIRST REACH THE STATUTE ~~LIMITA~~ LIMITATION DATE, AT WHICH 'TIME BAR' BECOMES EXERCISEABLE),

892. HAVING NOT BEEN SATISFIED. ANOTHER EXAMPLE OF AN 'INACTIVE ACCRUED RIGHT PENDING DATE TO EXERCISE', WOULD INCLUDE WHEN A LIFER WHO IS SENTENCED BY THE COURT, WITH A NPP, AND LIFER IS WAITING FOR THE DESIGNATED DATE (WHICH WILL BE THE FIRST DATE AFTER WHICH SAID LIFER CAN LAWFULLY SUBMIT THEIR PAROLE RELEASE PAPERS), TO EXERCISE THEIR ACCRUED RIGHT TO APPLY FOR PAROLE RELEASE (THEIR RIGHT TO APPLY FOR PAROLE RELEASE, PER, CSA, IS IMPOSED UPON THEM AT THEIR SENTENCING HEARING, IT IS AN ACCRUED RIGHT (A SUBSTANTIVE RIGHT), AND INTRINSICALLY ATTRACTS PROCEDURAL RIGHTS AND LAWS TO PROTECT IT), SO THAT THE LEADING UP TO PERIOD (OF THE TIME WAITING UNTIL THEY CAN, PER DUE PROCESS, EXERCISE THEIR ACCRUED RIGHT 'TO APPLY' FOR PAROLE), IS THE 'CHARACTERISTIC' WHICH CAN CHANGE AT 'CONDITIONAL TIMES' AND/OR 'DUE TO CONDITIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES'. FOR SAID LIFER APPLICANT, ONCE THE 'CONDITIONAL TIME' OF THE DESIGNATED FIRST DATE UPON WHICH (PROCEDURAL LAW), PAROLE RELEASE APPLICATION CAN BE SUBMITTED, HAS BEEN REACHED ('PRE-REQUISITE CONDITION' OF ASSOCIATED AND RELEVANT DUE PROCESS), ~~THE~~ 'INACTIVE ACCRUED RIGHT PENDING DATE TO EXERCISE' CHANGES AND UPDATES TO 'ACTIVE ACCRUED RIGHT EXERCISEABLE'.
893. STILL RELATING TO SAME LIFER WITH NPP IMPOSED, BUT RELATING TO A DIFFERENT 'CHARACTER' OF (IMPOSED BY SENTENCING COURT), 'ACCRUED RIGHT' WHICH DOES NOT INCLUDE ANY ASPECT OF INACTIVITY PENDING DATE TO EXERCISE, AS IT IS EXERCISEABLE ONCE PLACED INTO OFFICIAL COURT RECORD, AND THAT IS THE ACTIVE ACCRUED RIGHT TO HAVE THEIR RESPECTIVE NPP (WHICH THE SENTENCING COURT IMPOSED AND OFFICIALLY RECORDED), IMMEDIATELY RECOGNISED, ACKNOWLEDGED AND THEREAFTER ENFORCED ACCORDINGLY BY THE STATE GOVERNMENT (CH. II [3.7]), WHICH WOULD ALSO FALL IN LINE WITH THE CONSTITUTIONAL OBLIGATION INTRINSIC
894. THERETO. [SEE TEXT AT 870. IBID.]. THE POINT IN HAVING NPP ACKNOWLEDGED AND ACCEPTED BY STATE GOVERNMENT (CH. II [3.7]), AFTER BEING IMPOSED (CH. III [3.7]), IS THE 'CONDITIONAL TIME' OF SPECIFIC DATE LINKING RIGHT TO APPLY FOR PAROLE, TO
895. FIRST DATE UPON WHICH PAROLE RELEASE APPLICATION CAN BE SUBMITTED, CAN ONLY BE PROPERLY AND ACCURATELY CALCULATED ACCORDING TO THE COURT IMPOSED NPP, WHICH IS ALSO CONSTITUTIONALLY [1. AND 3.] PROTECTED AGAINST INCREASE, BY ANY

PERSON, PARTY, ENTITY, AND QUITE SIGNIFICANTLY INCLUDES 'EVERY GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE WORKING FOR STATE GOVERNMENT PORTFOLIO EXISTING WITHIN CH.II [3.] OPERATIONS' (SOUTH AUSTRALIA), WHICH IN THIS MATTER INCLUDES CORRECTIONAL SERVICES DEPARTMENT, DCS MINISTER, DCS CHIEF EXECUTIVE, SA PAROLE BOARD, SA CROWN-SOLICITORS DEPARTMENT, SA PREMIER, BECAUSE, AN INCREASE TO A COURT IMPOSED NPP, IS ITSELF A PRODUCT OF STATUTE, JUST AS A SENTENCE (OF A LIFER), IS A PRODUCT OF STATUTE [38, 45, AND 84.]. AS A PRODUCT OF CREATION BY STATUTE JURISDICTIONAL COMPETENCE, SO TOO IS THE ASSIGNED NPP FORMING PART OF ANY LIFER'S SENTENCE (AS IMPOSED BY COMPETENT SENTENCING COURT), AND, THE DUE PROCESS ASSOCIATED WITH CREATING/INCREASING SUCH NPP IS STRICTLY CONTROLLED/PROTECTED BY RELEVANT PROCEDURAL LAWS, WHICH ALSO ATTRACT PROCEDURAL RIGHTS (RIGHT TO 'DUE PROCESS ACCORDING TO LAW'). CONSEQUENTIALLY, IF ANY ACT/DECISION IS DONE/CREATED WHICH RESULTS IN AN EFFECT THAT, ACCORDING TO THE S.A. GOVERNMENT, IS A LEGITIMATE INCREASE TO THE COURT IMPOSED NPP IMPOSED UPON A RESPECTIVE LIFER (AND THAT INCLUDES ANY PERIOD OF TIME CREATED BY SA PAROLE BOARD, DURING WHICH LIFER IS NOT ^{PERMITTED} ~~PERMITTED~~ TO APPLY FOR PAROLE, A NON-PAROLE PERIOD OF TIME), BUT IS NOT COMPETENTLY CREATED BY ANY SENTENCING COURT, THEREFORE ALSO NOT CREATED WITHIN COMPETENT JURISDICTION OF CH.III [1, AND 3.], THEN, THE SAID ACT/DECISION BY THE S.A. GOVERNMENT IS ILLEGALLY DONE, UNCONSTITUTIONALLY DONE, AND, IN SO ACTING/DECIDING, THE SA GOVERNMENT HAS NOT OBSERVED ALL RELEVANT PROCEDURAL LAWS (DUE PROCESS), WHICH MUST BE COMPLIED WITH, AND, HAS NOT OBSERVED ALL RELEVANT PROCEDURAL RIGHTS OWNED BY RESPECTIVE LIFER AS 'ACCRUED RIGHTS' (IMPOSED UPON SENTENCING).

900. AN 'ACCRUED RIGHT' (SUBSTANTIVE RIGHT LINKED TO SUBSTANTIVE LAWS), FORMING DUE PROCESS ASSOCIATED WITH LIFER'S PAROLE APPLICATION (INCLUDING IF SAID ACCRUED RIGHT IS ONLY ONE OF SEVERAL COMPONENTS, WHICH TOGETHER, WHEN PROPERLY OBSERVED, FORM THE COMPETENT DUE PROCESS), IS STOLEN/TAKEN FROM RESPECTIVE LIFER ILLEGALLY AND UNCONSTITUTIONALLY, IF ACCRUED RIGHT IS INTRINSIC TO COMPETENT COURT'S IMPOSED SENTENCE, BUT IS DENIED

APPLICATION OF, OPERATION OF, OBSERVANCE OF, BY ANY ACTION OF SA GOVERNMENT

901. WITHIN CH. II [1. AND 3.], FOR EXAMPLE, MY 'ACCURED RIGHT' TO HAVE MY COURT IMPOSED SENTENCE [74.], ENFORCED BY CH. II [1. AND 3.] COMPLIANCE WITH SA GOVERNMENT'S MANDATORY OBSERVANCE, OF ITS CONSTITUTIONAL OBLIGATION TO CARRY OUT SENTENCE IMPOSED UPON ME BY CH. III [1. AND 3.], THE CRIMINAL LAW SENTENCING COURT, ESPECIALLY WHEN THE COMPLAINED OF ACTION (BY ME, AGAINST SA GOVERNMENT), IS DUE TO ULTRA VIRES ACTIVITY
902. ("... IF SUCH AN ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL FALLS INTO ERROR OF LAW WHICH CAUSES IT TO... MAKE AN ERRONEOUS FINDING OR TO REACH A MISTAKEN CONCLUSION, AND THE TRIBUNAL'S EXERCISE OR PURPORTED EXERCISE OF POWER IS THEREBY AFFECTED, IT EXCEEDS ITS AUTHORITY OF POWERS. SUCH AN ERROR OF LAW IS JURISDICTIONAL WHICH WILL INVALIDATE AN ORDER OR DECISION OF THE TRIBUNAL WHICH REFLECTS..." [83.]), BY THE SA GOVERNMENT WHO LACKED JURISDICTION TO MAKE SAID DECISION, SO THEN, HOW CAN THE RESPECTIVE SA GOVERNMENT RETAIN AND CLAIM PROFESSIONALISM AND INTEGRITY, WHEN THEIR COMPLIANCE OBLIGATION WITH 'CUL' AND 'AJL' IS REFUSED BY THEM!! [SEE TEXT AT 870. IBID.]
903. THE POINT OF HAVING A CONSTITUTION [1.], AND DESIGNATED REALMS OF JURISDICTIONAL AUTHORITY AND COMPETENCE THEREIN [3.], IS TO CLARIFY AND THEREAFTER PROTECT THE DESIGNATED, ASSIGNED AND RESTRAINED/RESTRICTED
904. JURISDICTIONAL AUTHORITIES THEREIN [1. AND 3.]. FOR THIS REASON, FOR EXAMPLE, STATE PARLIAMENT [3.] CANNOT FORCE STATE CRIMINAL COURTS [3.] TO MAKE AN OFFICIAL RULING/JUDGMENT, BECAUSE CH. I [3.] JURISDICTIONAL COMPETENCE OPERATES ONLY WITH REGARD TO CREATING STATUTES, CH. I [3.] CANNOT
905. IMPOSE 'OPERATIONAL EFFECT UPON A PERSON' (OF CREATED STATUTE). ALSO, CH. III [3.] JURISDICTIONAL COMPETENCE OPERATES ONLY WITH REGARD TO IMPOSING STATUTES (TO IMPOSE A PENALTY/SENTENCE UPON A PERSON), CH. III [3.] CANNOT CREATE OR ENFORCE 'THE STATUTES WHICH IT IMPOSES AND APPLIES TO A PERSON WHOM IT
906. SENTENCES'. THE CRIMINAL COURT, OPERATING WITHIN COMPETENT JURISDICTION OF CH. III [3.], ALSO HAS ^{JURISDICTIONAL} ~~JURISDICTIONAL~~ COMPETENCE TO RULE/MAKE ITS OWN DECISIONS, INDEPENDENT OF CH. I AND/OR CH. II [3.], AS EXEMPLIFIED WITH MY 2002 JUDGMENT [74.], WHEREIN THE COURT INSTRUCTED AND ORDERED

- ITSELF TO VOID AND NULLIFY THE 'CURRENT' SENTENCING STATUTES (CLSA AND CSA, WHICH WERE OPERATIONAL AT THAT TIME [78, AND 80.]), AND ONLY APPLY 1992 SENTENCING STANDARDS AND THE REASONS WHY ([75, 77, 79, 80, AND 78.]) PLUS, IN THE HEADNOTE [75.], "Held: ... (1) The Court of Criminal Appeal had erred in CONSIDERING THE RELEVANCE OF THE PETITIONERS' YOUTH WHEN FIXING THE PETITIONERS' NON-PAROLE PERIOD AND THAT THEREFORE THE NON-PAROLE PERIOD SHOULD BE CONSIDERED AFRESH, [53.]", THAT COURT (2002) DETERMINED SUCH A DEGREE OF ERROR EXISTED IN THE JUDGMENT OF THE CCA IN 1994, IT USED AND APPLIED ITS COMPETENT JURISDICTION (CH, III [3.1]), TO EXPUNGE ALL OPERATIONAL EFFECT OF SAID CCA ~~JUDGMENT~~ JUDGMENT FROM 1994, TO MUTE AND PROHIBIT ALL OPERATIONAL EFFECT OF 'THEN EXISTING CURRENT SENTENCING STANDARDS' (THOSE OPERATIONAL IN 2002 IN SOUTH AUSTRALIA), TO THEN IMPOSE ITS PROPER SENTENCE UPON ME; 908. THE COURT IN 2002 [74.], OWNED THE 'ACCURED RIGHT' OF COMPETENT JURISDICTION (ACCURED RIGHT CREATED IN [1.], CLASSIFIED AND GOVERNED BY SAME [3.]), WHICH INCLUDED THEREIN THE 'SUBSTANTIVE RIGHT' IN SUBSTANTIVE LAW, TO PERFORM, PER DUE PROCESS (PROCEDURAL LAW), 'THE ABROGATION OF THEN OPERATIONAL CLSA, WHICH, PER INTRINSIC CONSEQUENCE OF SAID ABROGATION, MUST ADDITIONALLY INCLUDE ABROGATION OF THEN OPERATIONAL CSA [85.], THEN, APPLY ONLY 1992 SENTENCING STANDARDS (CLSA AS AT 1992, CSA AS AT 1992), AS DESCRIBED IN ANDREWS AT PARAGRAPH 20 [207.], AND THEN, APPLYING OPERATION OF 1992 STANDARDS, IMPOSED ITS COMPETENTLY CREATED AND DELIVERED SENTENCE UPON ME, 909. AND, DID SO IN A MANNER CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED FROM INCREASE (ACCURED RIGHTS OF COMPETENT JURISDICTION OWNED BY THE CRIMINAL LAW SENTENCING COURT (SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS (RIGHT OF COMPETENCE, RIGHT OF JURISDICTION), ONLY PERMITTED TO BE ACTIONABLE IN AND BY THE COURTS, PER JURISDICTION CREATED IN AND BY [1.]) (AS INDICATED IN [3.1]), WHICH MUST BE ACTIONED/OBSERVED PRO-ACTIVELY WITHIN COURTS (CH, III [3.1]), PER STATUTORY DUE PROCESS (STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH COMPETENT JURISDICTION MUST ENSURE THE COURT ALWAYS ACTS TO PROTECT ITS PROCEDURAL OBLIGATIONS, AND, TO BAR/PROHIBIT ACTIONS OF OTHERS' (SUCH AS PARLIAMENT (CH, I [3.1]), EXECUTIVE STATE GOVERNMENT (CH, II [3.1]), FROM ILLEGALLY AND UNCONSTITUTIONALLY ACTIONING AN

OPERATIONAL EFFECT WHICH SAID 'OTHERS', DUE TO HAVING NO COMPETENT JURISDICTION IN
 912. [1.], HAVE NO TRUE OPERATIONAL AUTHORITY TO EVEN EXIST (A GOOD EXAMPLE WOULD INCLUDE
 HOW SA. GOVERNMENT (CH. II [3.]), REFUSE TO OBSERVE, COMPLY WITH AND ENFORCE THE
 SENTENCE IMPOSED UPON ME IN 2002 [74., 75., 77., 78., 79. AND 80.], AND HAVE INSTEAD
 DETERMINED THEIR OWN SENTENCE TO ENFORCE AGAINST ME, WHICH UNTIL NOW HAS
 INCLUDED AN ADDITIONAL 7. YEARS IN PRISON, BEFORE THEY WOULD ACCEPT A ^{PAROLE} ~~PAROLE~~
 RELEASE APPLICATION FROM ME, WHERE PER COURT SENTENCE [74.] MY NPP EQUATED
 TO 2009, BUT STATE GOVERNMENT INSTEAD IMPOSED AND THEN HAS ENFORCED A NOVEMBER
 2016 NPP, AND PERFORMED SUCH OPERATIONAL EFFECT STRICTLY FROM WITHIN
 913. CH. II [3.])], WHEREBY PROCEDURAL LAW OBLIGATES THE COURTS TO PROTECT ITS
JURISDICTIONAL COMPETENCE WITHOUT EXCEPTION, TO REPAIR/RECTIFY EXISTING
FAILURES TO COMPLY WITH ITS IMPOSED SENTENCES (BY CH. II [3.]), AS EXAMPLED
ABOVE), EXCEPT BY AN OPERATIONAL EFFECT ACTIONED BY CH. II [3.], PER STATUTE
REQUIREMENT, SUCH AS [45. AND 40.], OR, BY A HIGHER COURT WITH PROPER
JURISDICTIONAL COMPETENCE.

914. AS INDICATED ABOVE, IT ISN'T JUST THE SENTENCED LIFER, AT THE POINT OF THEIR
 RESPECTIVE SENTENCE BEING DELIVERED UPON THEM AND IMPOSED FROM THEN ONWARDS, WHO
 915. ACQUIRES 'ACCRUED RIGHTS'. ACCRUED RIGHTS CAN ALSO BE OWNED BY THE COURTS
 THEMSELVES, SUCH AS WHEN PROCEDURAL LAW (DUE PROCESS), IS USED IN AND BY THE
 COURTS (PER PROCEDURAL RIGHTS LINKED TO THE COMPETENCE OF RESPECTING COURT AND
 JURISDICTIONAL AUTHORITY TOO), TO RE-ASSERT/ENFORCE A SENTENCE ALREADY
 IMPOSED ON A LIFER, BUT WHICH THE STATE GOVERNMENT (CH. II [3.]), REFUSES OR
 FAILS TO ENFORCE (INSTEAD CREATING AND ENFORCING A GREATER PENALTY OF SENTENCE
 916. THAN WHAT WAS IMPOSED BY THE SENTENCING COURT). THE 'PROCEDURAL LAW' AND
 'PROCEDURAL RIGHTS' IN THIS INSTANCE ARE ~~■~~ INTRINSIC IN THE 'ACCRUED RIGHTS'
 ('SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS'), ACTIONABLY PROTECTED IN ASSOCIATED 'SUBSTANTIVE LAW',
 WHICH ARE THEN PURSUED VIA 'PROCEDURAL LAW' (DUE PROCESS GOVERNS METHOD).
 917. THOUGH THE COURT ITSELF CANNOT INITIATE SUCH AN ACTION, AS JUST DESCRIBED, AND IN
 FACT, IT IS GENERALLY THE LIFER WHOSE COURT IMPOSED SENTENCE ISN'T BEING PROPERLY
 APPLIED AND ENFORCED BY STATE GOVERNMENT, WHO ACTUALLY INITIATES THE JUDICIAL

918. COMPLAINT ABOUT SAME, THE ROLE OF THE COURT, THE AUTHORITY AND JURISDICTIONAL COMPETENCE WITHIN CH. III [1. AND 3.], IS WHERE THE COMPETENT COURT OPERATES TO PROTECT WHAT ITS LOWER COURT HAS CREATED, BY GOVERNING AND ENSURING COMPLIANCE, WITH ALL RELEVANT FORMAL
919. PROCEDURES AND PROCESSES, ATTACHED THERETO. IT IS RELEVANT AND FACTUAL TO ADD, ^{THAT} ~~THE~~ THE DESCRIBED 'SUBSTANTIVE LAWS AND RIGHTS', AND 'PROCEDURAL LAWS AND RIGHTS', 'OWNED BY THE COURTS' [SEE TEXT AT 915 AND 916.], ARE CONTROLLED BY THE JUDICIAL COMPLAINT SUBMITTED BY RESPECTIVE LIFER, AND THEMSELVES GOVERNED IN THEIR OPERATION BY THE STRUCTURE OF SAID LIFER'S JUDICIAL
920. COMPLAINT, AGAINST THE ACTIONS OF THE STATE GOVERNMENT. IN THIS REGARD, THE COURTS (CH. III [3.]), ARE THE PROCESS/PROCEDURAL MEANS THROUGH WHICH IMPOSED SENTENCE ACCRUED RIGHTS ARE PROTECTED [6. AND 7.], SO THE USE OF, AND OPERATION ~~OF~~ OF THE COURTS, IS EMBEDDED WITHIN AND INTRINSIC TO SAID 'ACCRUED RIGHTS', 'ACCRUED OBLIGATIONS', ASSOCIATED WITH A SOUTH AUSTRALIAN LIFER'S IMPOSED SENTENCE.
921. WITHIN MY RIGHTS (AS A SENTENCED LIFER (2002), TO 1992 SENTENCING STANDARDS [74., 75., 78. AND 80.]), TO ENGAGE THE FUNCTION OF THE APPEAL/JUDICIAL REVIEW COURTS, SO AS TO COMPLAIN OF CONDUCT BY STATE GOVERNMENT (SOUTH AUSTRALIA), AS DESCRIBED HEREIN, OF THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL OBLIGATIONS [SEE TEXT AT 870. IBID], TO ENFORCE ONLY THE COURT IMPOSED SENTENCE OF 2002 [74.], BUT WHICH THE STATE GOVERNMENT (~~CH. II~~ (CH. II [3.])), REFUSE TO ABIDE BY, IT IS ALSO
922. RELEVANT TO NOTE, WITH PROPRIETOUS CURIOSITY... IF THE STATE GOVERNMENT WHICH IS ONLY PERMITTED TO OPERATE ITS BUSINESS WITHIN REALM OF CH. II [3.], IN RELATION TO OBSERVING AND ENFORCING, ONLY THE SENTENCE [74.] IMPOSED UPON ME, BY THE COMPETENCE GRANTED TO THE COMPETENT COURT SITTING IN THE REAM OF CH. III [3.], BUT WHICH THE STATE GOVERNMENT (CH. II [3.]), ACTING CONTRARY TO THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL OBLIGATIONS (ATTACHED TO SAME), REFUSE TO COMPLY WITH AND ENFORCE, INSTEAD, ENFORCING A SENTENCE AGAINST ME WHICH WAS NEVER CREATED IN A COURT, WAS NEVER CREATED BY A JUDGE, WAS NEVER EVEN CREATED IN CH. III [3.], AND WAS NEVER EVEN

CREATED BY APPLICATION OR OPERATION OF THE CRIMINAL LAW SENTENCING ACT (s. 56. PROCEEDINGS FOR ENFORCEMENT OF A SENTENCE MAY NOT BE COMMENCED EXCEPT AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH **THIS ACT**. [45.]),

AND IS A SIGNIFICANTLY GREATER 'PENALTY' THAN WHAT WAS CREATED AND IMPOSED BY THE COMPETENT COURT [74.] (INCLUDING MORE THAN 7. YEARS INCARCERATED, ADDITIONAL TO WHAT WAS ACTUALLY IMPOSED BY THE COURT [74.], RELATING TO 'NON-PAROLE

923. PERIOD IMPOSED BY SAID COURT' [78. AND 80.]), THEN, THE ACTUAL REASON FOR ME BEING INCARCERATED IS NO LONGER DUE TO LAWFULLY ENFORCED SENTENCE, THEREFORE, IT CAN ONLY BE DUE TO AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL ([1.]), ACTION BY STATE GOVERNMENT (CH. II [3.]), WHICH I HAVE ABOVE IDENTIFIED AS A **'FAKE SENTENCE'**.

924. THERE IS NO 'SUBSTANTIVE RIGHT OR LAW', OR, 'PROCEDURAL RIGHT OR LAW', HELD BY ANY PERSON OR ENTITY OPERATING CH. I. (PARLIAMENT), OR CH. II (EXECUTIVE STATE GOVERNMENT) [1. AND 3.], WHICH ENABLES/PERMITS THE CREATION OF ANY DECISION WHICH THEN CARRIES THE OPERATIONAL EFFECT OF A NPP [83.].

925. THERE IS ALSO NO STATUTORY DESIGNATE WITHIN ANY SOUTH AUSTRALIAN STATUTE, FOR ANY INCREASE ~~TO~~ TO ANY ~~LIFER'S~~ LIFER'S COURT IMPOSED NPP, OTHER THAN WHAT IS CLEARLY AND UNAMBIGUOUSLY WRITTEN WITHIN THE CRIMINAL LAW SENTENCING ACT, PARTICULARLY 'SECTION 32. DUTY OF COURT TO FIX OR

926. EXTEND NON-PAROLE PERIODS'. NO PERIOD OF TIME WHICH OPERATIONALLY EQUATES TO A NPP, CAN LAWFULLY BE CREATED, OTHER THAN BY A COMPETENT SENTENCING COURT, WHEN THE PRISONER (CONVICTED), BEING SENTENCED, OR WHO IS ALREADY SENTENCED, IS A LIFER, AND THEREFORE CAN ONLY EVER BE PERFORMED WITHIN THE REALM OF CH. III [3.].

927. IF THERE IS NO STATUTORY AUTHORITY (WHICH THERE IS NOT), TO CREATE AND/OR IMPOSE ANY PERIOD OF TIME, WHICH OPERATIONALLY EQUATES TO A NON-PAROLE PERIOD OF TIME, THEN, CH. I (PARLIAMENT), AND CH. II (EXECUTIVE STATE GOVERNMENT)

928. [1. AND 3.], MUST ALSO NOT HOLD ANY 'JURISDICTIONALLY COMPETENT SUBSTANTIVE LAW', OR 'JURISDICTIONALLY COMPETENT PROCEDURAL LAW', TO ATTACH TO/ANCHOR TO THE 'CREATION OF ANY PERIOD OF TIME WHICH OPERATIONALLY EQUATES TO A NON-PAROLE

929. PERIOD, RELATING TO A LIFER WHO HOLDS A COURT IMPOSED NPP, THE CLEAR AND OBVIOUS FACT IS THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA (CH. II [3.]), AND ITS STATE PARLIAMENT (CH. I [3.]), HAVE ILLEGALLY AND UNCONSTITUTIONALLY CREATED A 'PLATFORM', IRRESPECTIVE OF DELIBERATE ACTION OR NOT, USING PARLIAMENT [51.], TO CREATE AND PASS [15.], INTO STATUTE [46.], AN ILLEGALLY OPERATIONAL [28.], GROUP OF AMENDMENTS ([28.] "22 A. (1) EVERY ACT AND EVERY PROVISION OF AN ACT WILL ([30.], THE WORD "WILL" IS ABSOLUTE IN ITS DISTINCTION AND ON PAR WITH "SHALL" IN [30.]
930. BE CONSTRUED SO AS TO NOT EXCEED THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATE."), WHICH IN THEIR PROCEDURAL APPLICATION AND OPERATION AGAINST A LIFER SUCH AS ME [74. AND 75.], CAUSE AN ILLEGAL CONSEQUENCE (STEALING MY ACCRUED RIGHTS OF 'REMISSION CALCULATION TO MY COURT IMPOSED NPP', AND 'AUTOMATIC PAROLE RELEASE AT END OF MY
931. CALCULATED NPP' [126.], WHEREBY, USING MY CIRCUMSTANCE AS AN EXAMPLE, MY 2002 JUDGMENT [74.], HAS BEEN ILLEGALLY REJECTED BY STATE GOVERNMENT (EXISTING ONLY WITHIN CH. II [3.]), AS THE VALID IMPOSED SENTENCE DETERMINED PER ITS COMPETENT CONSIDERATIONS, AND, PROPER OBSERVATION AND APPLICATION OF
932. RELEVANT PROCEDURAL LAW (DUE PROCESS), AND THEN, WITHOUT ANY JURISDICTIONAL COMPETENCE, AND WITHOUT ANY APPLICATION OR OBSERVATION OF RELEVANT PROCEDURAL LAW, CREATED (WITHOUT CH. III [3.] JURISDICTIONAL AUTHORITY OR COMPETENCE, AND THEREFORE ALSO WITHOUT LEGALLY JUSTIFIABLE PROCEDURAL COMPLIANCE [38. AND 45.]), AN ILLEGALLY AND UNCONSTITUTIONALLY OPERATED PSUEDO-SENTENCE [28., 80., 78., 82.
933. AND 83.], WHICH IS NOT A TRUE SENTENCE BUT SOUTH AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT TREAT WHAT THEY ILLEGALLY CREATED, AS IF A TRUE SENTENCE (WITHIN THEIR CH. II [3.] OPERATIONS), EVEN THOUGH SAID STATE GOVERNMENT ILLEGALLY VIOLATED AND DISREGARDED THE PROCEDURAL LAWS (WHICH THEMSELVES ATTRACTED ABSOLUTE JURISDICTIONAL COMPETENCE SO AS TO CREATE [74.]), WHICH EXISTED TO CREATE AND
934. PROTECT MY 2002 ~~IMPOSED~~ IMPOSED JUDGMENT' ([74.]), CONSEQUENTING AN ILLEGAL ACTION BY SOUTH AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT (ILLEGAL USE OF CH. II [3.]), BREACHING PROCEDURAL LAWS RELATING TO COURTS' 2002 IMPOSED SENTENCE [74.] (IF STATE GOVERNMENT WISHED TO EXTEND MY NPP PER 2002 [74.], DUE PROCESS (PROCEDURAL LAWS MANDATED [38. AND 45.]), THEY SHOULD HAVE ACTED LAWFULLY RATHER THAN

KNOWINGLY ACT IN CONTRAVENTION OF KNOWN (RELEVANT AND ASSOCIATED), PROCEDURAL LAWS [65. ("FAILURE OF PROCESS"), 82. AND 83.]).

935. THE COURT (RE MY 2002 JUDGMENT [74.]), WHICH IMPOSED MY 2002 JUDGMENT, BEING THE FULL COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA, RESULTING FROM SAID SITING IN THE CRIMINAL JURISDICTION, APPLYING SENTENCING ACT (WITHIN SAID SITING), AT THE POINT OF DELIVERING IMPOSED SENTENCE TO ME, THEREAFTER ~~THE~~ ACQUIRED AN ACCRUED OWNERSHIP IN PROCEDURAL LAW (DUE PROCESS), THE COMPETENT RIGHT TO PROTECT ITS CREATION, MY 2002 JUDGMENT [74.], BY WAY
936. OF JUDICIAL PROCESSES ([3.]). THE STATE GOVERNMENT (CH. II [3.]), ILLEGALLY 'REFUSED/NEGLECTED' TO FRONT THE COURTS (CH. III [3.]), IN ORDER TO QUALIFY ITS INTERPRETATION OF THE COURT JUDGMENT PROPER [74.], WHICH THE STATE GOVERNMENT (CH. II [3.]), STILL BELIEVES IS CALCULATED, DELIVERED AND IMPOSED ONLY ACCORDING TO, AND THEREFORE, BY APPLICATION AND OPERATION OF, 2002 [46.]
937. SENTENCING STANDARDS. ALL THE STATE GOVERNMENT (CH. II [3.]), NEEDED TO DO WAS APPLY TO THE FULL COURT FOR A 'CLARIFICATION HEARING', ESPECIALLY CONSIDERING PER PROCEDURAL LAW, THE ONLY CONSTITUTIONALLY (L.I.) COMPETENT JURISDICTION TO HOLD AND CONSIDER AND 'RULE' ^{ABOUT} SAID 'CLARIFICATION HEARING', IS A COURT SITTING AND OPERATING ONLY WITHIN CH. III
938. [1., 3., 5., 6., 7., 11. AND 12.]. THE SOUTH AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT VIOLATED DUE PROCESS ACCORDING TO RELEVANT LAWS, ADMINISTRATIVELY CHANGED (WITHIN CH. II [3.] ACTIONS), THE MEANING OF PENALTY IMPOSED BY THE COURT (WHO ACTED IN CH. III [3.] REALM [74.]), ERRONEOUSLY, ILLEGALLY AND UNCONSTITUTIONALLY [1. AND 3.], THEN OPERATIONALLY ENFORCED AGAINST ME,
939. THEIR CH. II [3.] CREATED FAKE-SENTENCE (WATSON [194. (PARA. 11.)]), CONSEQUENTING A PERIOD OF TIME OF APPROXIMATELY 7. YEARS (A 'NON-PAROLE PERIOD OF TIME'), ADDITIONAL TO COURT'S IMPOSED NPP OF 2002 [74.],
940. WITHIN WHICH THE SOUTH AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT CONSIDER ANY 'PAROLE RELEASE' APPLICATION FROM ME OR ABOUT ME, EFFECTING AN OPERATIONAL NPP AGAINST ME
941. WHICH BY THEIR CLAIM EQUATED TO NOV. 2016 NPP DATE, BUT, IN FACT, PER 2002 JUDGMENT [74.], EQUATED TO APPROX. 2009 NPP DATE AND INTRINSIC OPERATION OF